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At a time of political movement from illiberal rule, questions of
transitional justice remain largely unaddressed. How is the social understanding
behind a new regime committed to the rule of law created? Which legal acts
have transformative significance? What, if any, is the relation between a state's
response to a repressive past and its prospects for creating a liberal order?
Debates about transitional justice are generally framed by the normative
proposition that various legal responses should be evaluated on the basis of
their prospects for democracy. 1 The prevailing approaches yield limited
positive accounts that miss the particular significance of justice claims in
periods of political change. Such theorizing also fails to explain the
relationship between normative responses to past injustice and the prospects
for liberal transformation. This Article attempts to move beyond prevailing
theorizing to explore legal responses in periods of political transformation. It
suggests that these legal responses play an extraordinary constituting role in
such periods.
Within comparative political theory, the dominant approach is to explain
a state's legal responses in terms of the political and institutional constraints
of the transition. The dominant approach considers the search for justice an
epiphenomenon, explained in terms of the balance of power. 2 From the realist
perspective, the question of why a given state response occurred is conflated
with the question of what response was possible. 3 Law is considered a product
I. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE F'UTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992); CARLOS SM"TIAGO
NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996); John Hen. An Hisroncal Penpecr1w, 111 STATE CRL\IES:
PUNISHMENT OR PARDON II, 16 (Alice H. Henkin ed .• 1989). The scholarly pcrspccuves on 1he qucsuon
have tended to adopt either a response-sensitive approach or a regional approoch. For comparative
approaches, see the essays collected in TRANsmoNs 1-lWM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES (Guillermo O'Donnell Cl al. eds., 1986). Su also JUAN J LIN"l & AU'RED SlCPAN,
PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANsmoN AND CONSOLIDATION (1996) (cxplonng processes of transition
and consolidation from comparative perspective). Particularly m responsc-scnsmve approaches, there has
been a substantial debate over punishment. See, e.g., Jaime Malamud-Gou, Transwonal Gownunenrs 111
the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q, I 0990); infra note 172 These rcsponscsensitive approaches, however, like the country-scnsim·e approochcs. fall to capture the scope and
significance of the role of the law in transition contended for here.
Works that move beyond the case study or regional approach often confine themselves to a partu:ular
historical moment. See, e.g .• FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: COPING WITH THE LEGACIES Of
AUTHORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM (John Herz ed .. 1982) (focusing on postwar pcncxl) For the
classic inquiry into the question of political justice, sec Orro KIRCHHEL\IER, POLITICAL JUSTlCE: THE USE
OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (1961). Kirchhe1mer's classic cxplorauon of pohucal JUSUCe
includes successor trials as an example of the phenomenon of politically mouvated JUSUce_ Su 1d. at
304-47.
2. The explanatory power of this scholarship goes to the qucsuon of why translllonal JUSUce 15 a vuaJ
issue in some countries, but not in others. Sa LIN"l & STEPAN, supra note I. TRA.i.ismo:-:s 1-ltoM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE, supra note I (collecting essays that adopt primarily regional appro~hJ, su also
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TwE.,lll:"Tll Ce.llJRY 21 S
(1991); Stephen Holmes, 17ze End of Decommu111zatio11, E. EUR CONST REV., Summcr/F.tll 199-1. at 33
3. See generally CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY ANO INTI:llNATIONAL Rl:LATIONS 15-66
(1979) (discussing flaws of moral skepticism as applied to state acuon): R.BJ WALKER. L'l:Sll>EIOUTSIDE.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLmCAL THEORY 123-24 (1993). For sound summancs o! the realm
school in international theory, see JOHN H. HERZ, PoLmCAL REALISM AND POLITICAL IDl:ALISM !1951).
MARTIN WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL THEORY: THE THREE TRADmONS (1991); and J Ann Tickner, Haru
Morgentlzau's Principles: A Feminist Refonnularion, 111 INTERNATIONAL THl:ORY CRmCAL
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of political change. The path of the transition is thought to explain the
prevailing balance of power, which in tum purportedly explains the legal
response. However, to say that states do what they can does not explain the
great diversity of transitional legal phenomena. To say states do what is
possible, as in the realist account, conflates the descriptive account with its
normative conclusions. 4 The connection between a state's response to the
transitional problem and its prospects for liberal transformation remain
essentially unjustified. Nor is the idealist account satisfactory. From the idealist
perspective, the question of transitional justice generally falls back upon
universalist conceptions of justice.5 Yet this approach misses distinctive
features of conceptions of justice in extraordinary periods of transition.
The realist/idealist antinomy on the relation of law to politics shares
affinities with liberal/critical theorizing about law and politics. In liberal
theorizing, law is commonly conceived as following idealist conceptions
unaffected by political context,6 while critical legal theorizing, like the realist
approach, emphasizes law's close relation to politics. 7 Again, liberal/critical
theorizing about the nature and role of law in ordinary times does not account
well for law's role in periods of political change. 8
Moving away from the prevailing approaches, adopting a largely inductive
method, and exploring an array of legal responses, I describe a distinctive
conception of law and justice in the context of political transformation. Several
important legal responses discussed herein arise out of the contemporary wave
of political change, including the transitions from Communist rule in Eastern
and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as from repressive
military rule in Latin America and Africa. Where relevant, I draw upon
historical illustrations, from ancient times to the Enlightenment, from the
French and American revolutions through the postwar and contemporary
lNvESTIGATIONS 53, 55-57 (James Der Derian ed., 1995).
4. For such an argument, see HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 231.
5. See ACKERMAN, supra note l, at 69-73; E.B.F. M!DOLEY, THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION AND THE
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 219-31, 350-70 (1975).
6. Liberal approaches predominate in theorizing in international law and politics. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 205 (1993). The liberal tradition in jurisprudence informs these approaches. See, e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKINO RIOHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). See generally
LIBERALISM AND THE Gooo (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990) (discussing liberalism's commitment to
neutrality). The paradigmatic expression of liberal theory's views on law and politics can be found in JOHN
RAWLS, PoLmcAL LIBERALISM (1993); and John Rawls, The Domain of tile Political and Overlapping
Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REY. 233 (1989).
7. Prominent collections of critical legal studies (CLS) essays include JAMES BOYLE, CRmcAL LEOAL
STUDIES (1992); and DAVID KAIRYS, THE PoLmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE (rev. ed. 1990).
See also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANOABEIRA UNGER,
THE CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); James Boyle, Tile Politics of Reason: Critical Legal
171eory and Local Social 17wugllt, 133 U. PA. L. REY. 685 (1985) (discussing legal realism, linguistic
theory, and Marxist theory). For critical treatment of international legal issues, see Nigel Purvis, Critical
Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81 (1991); and Phillip R. Trimble,
International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REY. 811 (1990).
8. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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periods. I begin by rejecting the notion that the movement toward a more
liberal democratic political system implies a universal nonn. Instead, the
Article offers an alternative way of thinking about the relation of law to
political transformation. The interpretive inquiry proceeds on a number of
levels. On one level, I attempt to provide a better account of transitional
practices. Study of the law's response in periods of political change offers a
positive understanding of the nature of accountability for past wrongs. On
another level, I explore the normative relation between legal responses to
repressive rule, conceptions of transitional justice, and our intuitions about the
construction of the liberal state.
What might the study of legal responses following repressive rule tell us
about the conceptions of justice in such periods? The central question of
transitional justice arises within a distinctive context. a shift in political
orders. 9 The "transitional" period begins right after the revolution or political
change; thus, the problem of transitional justice arises within a bounded period,
spanning two regimes. 10 In the contemporary period, the use of the tenn
"transition" has come to mean change in a liberalizing direction; accordingly,
the transitions discussed here have a concededly nonnative direction. 11 In
transitional periods, there are continuities among these legal responses. The
next question is what rules of recognition govern transitions. Here, my aim is
to shift the focus away from the traditional political criteria associated with
liberalizing change to take account of other practices, particularly the nature
9. In focusing upon the stage of ''transition," I choose to shift the tcnns of the vocabulary employed
by prior constitutional theorists to analyze the rule of law m political change. They speak m terms of
revolution and suggest that law's role comes in at the last stage of revolution. Su ACKERMAN. supra note
I, at 11-14; HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLtmON 139-78 {1%3). Rather than an undefined last stage of
revolution, the notion of transition is more capacious: It demarcates a postrc,·oluuonary ume penod
IO. See GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER. lRANsmoss FROM AUTHOR!TARIA.'i
RULE: TENTATNE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 6 {1986) (dcfirung translllon as !he
interval between one political regime and another"). Within political science. there IS substarUtal debate
about the meaning of the term ''transition," and by implication its limiting stage, consobdauon •• Willun
one school of thought, "transition" is demarcated by objective political criteria, chiefl)' procedural in nature
For some time, the criteria for the transition to democracy have focused on elccuons am! related procedures
See JUAN J. LINZ, Totalitarian and Aurlwrirarian Regimes, in HANDBOOK OF POLmCAL SCIENCE:
MACROPOLmCAL THEORY 182-83 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson w. Polsby eds., 1975) For the classical
articulation, see ROBERT DAHL, POLYARCHY 20-32, 74-80 ( 1971 ). Thus Samuel Hunungton's formulation,
following Schumpeter, defines twentieth-century democratization to occur when the most powerful
collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections .. HUNTISGTOS, supra
note 2, at 7. For others, the uansition ends when all the politically significant groups accept the rule of law
See Richard Gunther et al., O'Donnell's 'Illusions': A Rejoinder, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1996, al 151. 153
Beyond this school are others that embrace a more teleological view of democracy The teleological
approach has been challenged for incorporating a bias towards western-style democracies For a cnuque
of the teleological view, see Guillermo O'Donnell, Illusions and Co11ceprual Flaws, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct.
1996, at 160, 163-64; and Guillermo O'Donnell, Illusions Abour Consolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996,
at 34. See also HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 7-8.
11. For illustrations of this liberalizing trend, sec generally FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY.
supra note I, which describes the democratic transitions of West Germany. Italy, Austru1. France, Japan.
Spain, Portugal, and Greece. To date, political scientists have not incorporated this posiuvc normative
direction expressly in their definition of the term. I embrace the notion that the contemporary understanding
of transition has a normative component of moving from less to more democratic regimes.
00

00
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and role of legal phenomena. 12 I explore the phenomenology of transition to
suggest that there is a close tie between the normative shift in understandings
of justice and law's role in the construction of transition. 13
Because transitional justice is justice within defined political parameters,
it is limited and partial. Understanding the particular problem occasioned by
the search for justice in the transitional context requires entering a distinctive
discourse, organized by dilemmas inherent to these extraordinary periods. The
threshold dilemma lies in the context of political transformation: Law is caught
between the past and the future, between backward-looking and forwardlooking, between retrospective and prospective. Transitions imply paradigm
shifts in the conception of justice; thus, law's function is inherently
paradoxical. In its ordinary social function, law provides order and stability,
but in extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law maintains order, even
as it enables transformation. Ordinary predicates about law simply do not
apply. In dynamic periods of political flux, legal responses generate a sui
generis paradigm of transformative law.
The thesis of this Article is that the conception of justice in periods of
political change is extraordinary and constructivist: It is alternately constituted
by, and constitutive of, the transition. The conception of justice that emerges
is contextual: What is deemed just is contingent and informed by prior
injustice. Responses to repressive rule inform the meaning of adherence to the
rule of law. As a state undergoes political change, legacies of injustice have
a bearing on what is d~emed transformative. To some extent, the emergence
of these legal responses instantiates transition. 14
I will explore the role of law in periods of political change by looking at
three areas that most reflect law's transformative potential: the rule of law,
criminal justice, and constitutional justice. Although these areas are generally
thought to be discrete categories of the law, periods of political shift illuminate
their affinities 15 and reveal how the law's response in such periods defies the
12. The constructivist approach proposed by this Article suggests a move away from defining
transitions purely in terms of democratic procedures, such as electoral processes, toward a broader inquiry
into other practices signifying acceptance of liberal democracy and the rule of law. This inquiry examines
the normative understandings, beyond majority rule, that are associated with liberal systems. This
observation has implications for certain debates in political science and constitutionalism and may well
share affinities with jurisprudential debates concerning what makes for the authority of law. See JOSEPH
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 214 (1979); infra note 19.
13. Not all transformations exhibit the same degree of normative shift from preexisting legal
understandings. One might conceptualize transitions in terms of their relation to the predecessor regime
along a transformative continuum, as "radical" or "conservative" in nature. See infra note 255 and
accompanying text (discussing American transition as conservative in nature).
14. As the discussion proceeds, it shall become evident that the law's role in periods of political
change is complex. Ultimately, this Article makes two claims: one about the nature and role of law in
periods of substantial political change, and another about law's role in constituting the transition. The
association of these responses with periods of political change advances the construction of societal
understanding that transition is in progress. See infra Part IV.
IS. The most common alternative advocates punishment of the ancien regime as a necessary element
in the transition to democracy. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
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usual categorization. These practices offer not only a way to delegitimate the
political opposition, but also a fonn of legitimation of the present, more liberal,
regime. 16 In each Part, I will show how various legal responses in periods of
substantial political change reflect similar developments in the law, enabling
the construction of nonnative shifts. Adjudications of the rule of law reflect
understandings of legitimacy; criminal justice establishes wrongdoing; and
transitional constitutionalism defines the state's political identity-all in a
liberalizing direction. The analysis proposed here illuminates a distinctive
understanding of law's phenomenology in periods of political change, an
understanding I tenn "transitional jurisprudence."
Part I concerns the rule of law in transition. In established democracies
during ordinary times, adherence to the rule of law implies the operation of
principles that constrain the purposes and application of the law. In periods of
substantial political change, by contrast, the transitional dilemma means that
the law is unsettled, and the rule of law is not well explained as a source of
ideal norms in the abstract. From the perspective of transitional jurisprudence,
the rule of law can be better understood as a normative value scheme
elaborated in response to past political repression supported by the prior legal
system. Transitional law is settled and unsettled. It is both backward- and
forward-looking, as it disclaims past illiberal, and reclaims future liberal.
norms.
Part II concerns criminal justice in transition. Successor trials have long
been thought to play a foundational role in the transformation to a more liberal
political order. Such trials draw a line demarcating the normative shift from
illegitimate to legitimate rule. Yet the exercise of criminal power in times of
substantial political change raises profound dilemmas. In the transitional
context, the ordinary principle of individual responsibility for past wrongdoing
is inapplicable, leading to the emergence of new criminal legal forms that may
contribute to the construction of a liberal politics.
In Part III, I explore transitional constitutionalism. Transitional
constitutionalism serves not only conventional constitutionalism's constitutive
purposes, but also its transformative purposes. While in ordinary times
constitutions are conceived as fully forward-looking, in periods of radical
change such constitutions are simultaneously backward- and forward-looking,
varying along a range of constitutional entrenchment. The values protected by
transitional constitutionalism, criminal justice, and the rule of law share
affinities in their normative relation to past political rule.
In Part IV, I bring together and analyze the various ways in which new
democracies respond to legacies of injustice. A pattern of legal responses. this
Article contends, reveals affinities in the nature and uses of the law, informing
16. Indeed, these practices facilitate construction of both an illcgiumatc opposmon and a lcgmmatc
political opposition associated with democratic order.
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the field of transitional jurisprudence. The analysis pursued here is
constructivist, 17 as it considers the transitional legal forms that emerge as a
distinctive paradigm responsive to the extraordinary problem of law in periods
of substantial political change. 18 Analysis of these legal responses suggests
that they defy traditional legal categorizations. In transitional jurisprudence, the
conception of law is partial, contextual, and situated between at least two legal
and political orders. Legal norms are necessarily multiple, the idea of justice
always a compromise. In transitional jurisprudence, the nature and role of law
centers upon its paradigmatic use in the normative construction of the new
political regime.
This Article offers the language of a new jurisprudence rooted in prior
political injustice. Conceiving of jurisprudence as transitional helps to elucidate
the nature and role of law during periods of radical political change. By
offering another way of conceptualizing law, transitional jurisprudence also has
implications that transcend these extraordinary periods. The problem of justice
during periods of political transformation has a potentially profound impact
upon the resulting societal shift in nonns and the groundwork for transformed
constitutional and legal regimes. The unresolved problems of transitional
justice often have lasting implications over a state's lifetime. I suggest a new
perspective through which to understand the significance of the enduring
political controversies that presently divide our societies.

I.

THE

RULE

OF

LAW

IN TRANSITION

I now turn to an exploration of the various legal responses to illiberal rule.
In this Part, I suggest that adherence to the rule of law during periods of
political upheaval creates a tension between rule of law as backward-looking
and forward-looking, as settled versus dynamic. In this dilemma, the rule of
law is ultimately contingent; rather than grounding legal order, it serves to
mediate the normative shift in justice that characterizes these extraordinary
periods. In democracies in ordinary times, the rule of law means adherence to

17. For a useful introduction to this constructivist approach, see PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUcnON OF REALITY 19 (1966), which describes the approach from a
sociological perspective. On constructivism in the law, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Towards
a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 814-40 (1987). See also ROBERTO MANGABBIRA
UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 246-51 (1987) (analyzing legal and institutional responses to "context change").
For a subtle treatment of the role of law in constructing community, see Robert Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). See generally JOHN BRIGHAM, THB CONSTITUTION OP INTBRBSTS
(1996) (discussing law's role in constructing political movements).
18. By use of the term "legal forms," I mean principles, norms, ideas, rules, practices, as well as the
agencies of legislation, administration, adjudication, and enforcement. See SALLY FALK MOORB, LAW AS
PROCESS 54 (1978). On the significance of legal forms, see Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Fann and Legal
Fann: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'y REV. 571, 571-72 (1977). Beyond
the legal forms discussed here are others explored in my forthcoming book, TRANsmoNAL JUSTICB. See
TEITEL, supra note t.
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known rules, as opposed to arbitrary government action. 19 Yet revolution
implies disorder and legal instability. The threshold dilemma of transitional
justice is the problem of the rule of law in periods of radical political change.
By their very definition, these are often times of massive paradigm shifts in
understandings of justice. Here societies are struggling with how to transform
their political, legal, and economic systems. If ordinarily the rule of law means
adherence to settled law, to what extent are periods of transformation
compatible with commitment to the rule of law? In such periods, what does the
rule of law mean?
The dilemma of the meaning of the rule of law transcends the moment of
political transformation and goes to the heart of the basis for a liberal state.
Even in ordinary periods, stable democracies struggle with questions about the
meaning of adherence to the rule of law. Versions of this transitional rule-oflaw dilemma are manifest in problems of successor justice, constitutional
beginnings, and constitutional change. 20 The rule-of-law dilemma tends to
arise in politically controversial areas, where the value of legal change is in
tension with the value of adherence to the principle of settled legal precedent.
In ordinary periods, the problem of adherence to legal continuity is created by
the passage of time. 21 In transformative periods, however, the value of legal
19. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (.. [G)ovemment mall 1ts actions ts bound
by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make 11 possible to for= wllh fau ccmunty how
the authority will use its ... powers in given circumstances and to plan one's md1\·1dual affairs on the basts
of this knowledge."). For a discussion of the general understanding of the role of rule of law m
democracies as restraint on arbitrary power, sec ROGER COTIERRELL. THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE
113-14 (1989), which describes the danger of viewing the state as an entity abo,·e the law For an
exploration of the relation of rule of Jaw to democracy, sec Jean Hampton. Democraq and rhe Rule of
Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 13 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994). The classic account of the
minimum requirements of legality is found in LON L. Fuu.ER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (n:\· ed.
1969). Ronald Dworkin offers the most prominent contemporary exposition of substanU\"e rule-of-law
theory. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 11-12 (1985) (arguing that .. nghts concepuon"
of rule of law "requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the rule book capture and enforce
moral rights"); see also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 91 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988) (pn:scnung modem
interpretation of government by law through reinterprctation of political theory of c1v1c n:pubhcantsm)
Margaret Jane Radin describes the philosophical undcrpinrung of modem approaches to the rule of
law as consisting of the following assumptions:
(1) law consists of rules; {2) rules are prior to particular cases, more general than pan1cular
cases, and applied to particular cases; (3) law is instrumental (the rules are apphcd to aclucve
ends); (4) there is a radical separation between government and citizens (then: are rule-g1,·ers
and appliers, versus rule-takers and compliers); (5) the person is a rational chooser ordering her
affairs instrumentally.
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering die Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 792 (1989). Su generally
COTIERRELL, supra (providing introduction to debate about nature of law); THE RULE OF LAw (Allan C.
Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (collecting several essays discussing rule of law); Roger
Cotterrell, The Rule of Law in Corporare Society: Newnann, Kircltheimer and rhe Lessons of \Ve1mar, 51
Moo. L. REV. 126, 126-32 (1988) (book review) (discussing British concepts of rule of law)
20. For an early discussion of the common themes in the concepts of the rule of law and of
constitutionalism, see A.V. DICEY, lNTRODUcrtON TO THE STuOY OF THE LAW OF TI!E CossnnmoN
107-22 (8th ed. 1915). See also E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975) (discussing ongm of Black
Act). The commonalities in the transitional form of these concepts are discussed below. Su infra Pan IV
21. The ideal of the rule of law as legal continuity is captured in the pnnc1plc of stare dectsts. a
predicate of adjudication in the Anglo-American legal system. Su Planned Parenthood v Casey. SOS U S
833, 854 (1992) ("[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constilution n:qum:s such
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continuity is severely tested. The question of the nonnative limits on legitimate
political and legal change for regimes in the midst of transfonnation is
frequently framed in tenns of a series of antinomies. The law as written is
compared to the law as right, positive law to natural law, procedural to
substantive justice, and so forth.
My aim is to resituate the rule-of-law dilemma by exploring societal
experiences that arise in the context of political transfonnation. My interest is
not in idealized theorizing about the rule of law in general. Rather, I attempt
to understand the meaning of the rule of law for societies undergoing massive
political change. This Part approaches the rule-of-law dilemma in an inductive
manner by resituating the question as it actually arises in its legal and political
contexts. It explores a number of historical postwar cases, as well as
precedents arising in the more contemporary transitions. Although the rule-oflaw dilemma arises commonly in the criminal context, the issues raise broader
questions about the ways in which societies in periods of intense political
change reason about the relation of law, politics, and justice. As shall become
evident, these adjudications reveal central ideas about the extraordinary
conception of the rule of law, and of values of justice and fairness in periods
of political change. 22
A. The Rule-of-Law Dilemma: The Postwar Transition
In periods of political change, a dilemma arises over adherence to the rule
of law that relates to the problem of successor justice. To what extent does
bringing the ancien regime to trial imply an inherent conflict between
predecessor and successor visions of justice? In light of this conflict, is such
criminal justice compatible with the rule of law? The dilemma raised by
successor criminal justice leads to broader questions about the theory of the
nature and role of law in the transfonnation to the liberal state.
The transitional dilemma is present in changes throughout political history.
It is illustrated in the eighteenth-century shifts from monarchies to republics,
but has arisen more recently in the post-World War II trials. In the postwar
period, the problem was the subject of a well-known Anglo-American
jurisprudential debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart, who took as their
point of departure the problem of justice after the collapse of the Nazi
regime. 23 Such postwar theorizing demonstrates that in times of significant

continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable."); see also Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (advocating "general rule of law" over
"personal discretion to do justice'').
22. See infra notes 51-75, 93-95, and accompanying text.
23. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. RBV. 593 (1958)
(defending positivism); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. Rav. 630 (1958) (criticizing Hart for ignoring role of morality in creation of law).
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political change, conventional understandings of the rule of Jaw are thrown into
relief. 24 Although the transitional context has generated scholarly theorizing
about the meaning of the rule of law, that theorizing does not distinguish
understandings of the role of law in ordinary and transitional times. Moreover,
the theoretical work that emerges from these debates frequently falls back on
grand, idealized models of the rule of Jaw. Such accounts fail to recognize the
exceptional issues involved in the domain of transitional jurisprudence. 25
The Hart-Fuller debate on the nature of Jaw focuses on a series of cases
involving the prosecutions of Nazi collaborators in postwar Germany. The
central issue for the postwar German courts was whether to accept defenses
that relied on Nazi law. 26 A related issue was whether a successor regime
could bring a collaborator to justice, and if so, whether that would mean
invalidating the predecessor laws in effect at the time the acts were
committed. 27 Hart, an advocate of legal positivism,:is argued that adherence
to the rule of law included recognition of the antecedent Jaw as valid. Prior
written law, even where immoral, should retain legal force and be followed by
the successor courts until such time as it is replaced. In the positivist position
advocated by Hart, the claim is that the principle of the rule of law governing
transitional decisionmaking should proceed-just as it would in ordinary
times-with full continuity of the written law.
In Fuller's view, the rule of law meant breaking with the pnor Nazi legal
regime. As such, Nazi collaborators were to be prosecuted under the new legal
regime: In the "dilemma confronted by Germany in seeking to rebuild her
shattered legal institutions .... Germany had to restore both respect for law
and respect for justice. . . . [P]ainful antinomies were encountered in
attempting to restore both at once ... ." 19 According to the German judiciary,

24. Other theorizing about the nature of the rule of Jaw m the works of Franz Neumann and Ono
Kirchheimer also takes this period as its poml of depanure Su KIRCHHEL\IER. supra note I. Jl 323-4 I.
FRANz NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUC11JRE AND PRACTICE OF NATIOSAL SOCIALISM 1933-19-W (2J
ed. 1944); FRANz NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW (1986) (hcmnJflcr NEUMA.!\'N, THE Rt:u 01- L\WI. THI:
RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED EsSAYS OF FRAN/. L NEUMM'N & 0Tro KIRCHHl:L\ll:R (\V1lh.un
E. Scheuerman ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGEi For an eng.igmg expos111on ol
the views of these scholars, see WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN. Bl:"TWF.EN THE NORM A.'.:0 THI: EXCEPTIOS THI:
FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1994), which auemplS 10 apply Neumann Jlld Ku~h11':1mer's
analysis to the twentieth-century capitalist welfare stale
25. Recognition of a domain of transi11onal junspruJcnlX ne\'erthdess r.IISCS .igam 111': LSSUe of the
relation of the exceptional rule of law to that in ordmary penods This issue 1s only r.i1scd here. but ts more
fully addressed in my forthcoming book, Tra11S111011al Jio11cr Su TEITEL, supra note t
26. See Recellt Cases, 64 HARV. L. REV 996, 1005--06 (1951 l (c1ung Judgment ol Jul) 27. 19-i9.
Oberlandesgericht (OLGJ (Bamberg), 5 SODDEUTSCHE JL'IUSTf.N Zl:ITUNG 207 (1950) !FR G JI
27. In the "Problem of the Grudge Informer," the issue msed m Bcv11brrg 1s set out m ~ h)'llolhct1'.il
somewhat abstracted from the postwar s11ua1ion: The so-called Purple Shin regm1e has been overthrown
and replaced by a democratic constiluuonal government. and the qucsuon 1s whcther 10 punish those who
had collaborated in the prior regime. See FuLLER, supra note 19. app at 245
28. For a thoughtful exploration of the meaning of legal pos1uv1sm. sec Frctlcnd( Sch.tuer, F11/lu >
/11temal Point of View, 13 LAW & PHIL. 285 (1994)
29. See Fuller, supra note 23, al 657. Whereas the rule-of-Jaw d1cho1omy was lr.imed m terms ol
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there is a dichotomy within the rule of law between the procedural legal right
and the moral right. In "severe cases," the moral right takes precedence.
Accordingly, formalist concepts of the law, such as adherence to putative prior
law, could be overridden by such notions of moral right. The natural law
position espoused by the German judiciary suggests that transitional justice
necessitates departing from prior putative law.30
The above debate failed to focus, however, on the distinctive problem of
law in the transitional context. In the postwar period, this dilemma arose as to
the extent of legal continuity with the Nazi regime: To what extent did the rule
of law necessitate legal continuity? A transitional perspective on the postwar
debate would clarify what is signified by the rule of law. That is, the content
of the rule of law is justified in terms of distinctive conceptions of the nature
of injustice of the prior repressive regime. The nature of this injustice affects
consideration of various alternatives, such as full continuity with the prior legal
regime, discontinuity, selective discontinuities, or moving outside the law
altogether. For positivists, full continuity with the prior legal regime is justified
by the need to restore belief in the procedural regularity that was deemed
missing in the prior repressive regime; the meta-rule-of-law value is due
process, understood as regularity in procedures and adherence to settled law.
The natural law claim for legal discontinuity is also justified by the nature of
the prior legal regime, but according to the conceptualization of past
tyranny: 31 The predecessor regime's immorality suggests that the rule of law
should be grounded in something beyond adherence to preexisting law.
To what extent is adherence to the laws of a prior repressive regime
consistent with the rule of law? Conversely, if successor justice implied
prosecuting behavior that was lawful under the prior regime, to what extent
might legal discontinuity instead be mandated by the rule of law? The
transitional context fuses these multiple questions of the legality of the two
regimes and their relationship to each other.
In the postwar debate, both natural law and positivist positions took as
their point of departure certain presumptions about the nature of the prior legal
regime under illiberal rule. 32 Both positions draw justificatory force from the
role of law in the prior regime; nevertheless, they differ as to what constitutes

procedural versus substantive ideas of justice, Fuller tries to elide these competing conceptions by proposing
a procedural view of substantive justice. See id. at 642-43.
30. For Fuller, however, it would not imply such a break because past "law" would not qualify as such
for failure to comply with various procedural conditions. See FULLER, supra note 19, at 96-97.
31. See GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1956); Gustav Radbruch, Die Emeurung des
Rec/its, 2 DIE WANDLUNG 8 (1947); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's
Injustice, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 1807 (1993) (reviewing !NGO MOLLER, HmER'S JUSTICE (1991)). On the
natural Jaw position on the rule of law, Fuller's position appears more nuanced as it attempts to offer u
procedural understanding of substantive justice values. See Fuller, supra note 23.
32. For an excellent account of this historical debate, see Stanley L. Paulson, Lon L. Fuller. Gustav
Radbruch, and the "Positivist" Thesis, 13 LAW & PHIL. 313 (1994).
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a transformative principle of legality. The pos1uv1st argument anempts to
divorce questions of the legitimacy of law under predecessor and successor
regimes. The response to past tyranny is thought not to lie in the domain of the
law at all, but instead in the domain of politics. If there is any independent
content given to the rule of law, it is that it ought not serve transient political
purposes. The positivist argument for judicial adherence to settled law,
however, relies on assumptions about the nature of legality under the
predecessor totalitarian regime. 33 The justification for adhering to prior law
in the transitional moment is that under prior repressive rule, adjudication
failed to adhere to settled law. On the positivist view, transfonnative
adjudication that seeks to "undo" the effect of notions of legality supporting
tyrannical rule would imply adherence to prior settled law.
The natural law position highlights the transfonnative role of law in the
shift to a more liberal regime. On this view, putative law under tyrannical rule
lacked morality and hence did not constitute a valid legal regime.l-' Insofar
as adjudication followed such putative law, it too was immoral in supporting
illiberal rule. 35 From the natural law perspective, the role of law in transition
is to respond to evil perpetuated under the past administration of justice.
Because of the role of judicial review in sustaining the repression, 36
adjudication as in ordinary times would not convey the rule of law. This theory
of transfonnative law promotes the nonnative view that the role of law is to
transform the prevailing meaning of legality. 37
In the postwar debate, the questions arose in the extraordinary political
context following totalitarian rule. Yet the conclusions abstract from the
context and generalize as if describing essential, universal attributes of the rule
of law, failing to recognize how the problem is particular to the transitional
context. Resituating the problem should illuminate our understanding of the
rule of law. I now turn from the postwar debate to more contemporary
instances of political change illustrating law's transfonnative potential. Those
instances exemplify the tension between idealized conceptions of the rule of
law and the contingencies of the extraordinary political context. Struggling
with the dilemma of how to adhere to some commitment to the rule of law in
such periods leads to alternative constructions, constructions that mediate
concepts of transitional rule of law.

33. See Han, supra note 23, at 617-18.
34. To some extent, in this normative legal theory. collapsing law and morality. the trans1t1onal
problem of the relation between legal regimes disappears.
35. Thus the cases of the informers are characterized as -pen·ers1ons m the admm151rauon of JUSUcc."'
See Full.ER, supra note 19, app. at 245.
36. This topic was discussed in the Han-Fuller debate. Su supra note 23; su also MOLLER. supra
note 31.
37. See Fuller, supra note 23, at 648.
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B. Shifting Visions of Legality: Post-Communist Transitions
The velvet revolutions' rough underside has been revealed in courts oflaw,
where debates about the content of the political transformation continue to
simmer. A number of controversies over successor criminal justice exemplify
the transitional rule-of-law dilemma. In this Section, I focus on two: In the
first case, a Hungarian law allowed prosecutions for offenses related to the
brutal Soviet suppression of the country's uprising in 1956;38 in the other,
unified Germany prosecuted its border guards for shooting civilians who were
attempting to make unlawful border crossings along the Berlin Wall. 39 Both
cases involve weighty symbols of freedom and repression: 1956 is considered
the founding year of Hungary's revolution, while the Berlin Wall and its
collapse is the region's central symbol of Soviet domination and demise. Both
cases illustrate the dilemmas implied in the attempt to effect substantial
political change through and within the law. Although the two cases seemingly
suggest diverging resolutions of the rule-of-law dilemma, they also reveal
common understandings.
After the political changes of 1991, Hungary's Parliament passed a law
permitting the prosecution of crimes committed by the predecessor regime in
putting down the popular 1956 uprising. Despite the passage of time since
these crimes were committed, the law would have lifted statutes of limitations
for treason and other serious crimes,40 effectively reviving these offenses. 41
The controversy over the statute of limitations law raised a broader question:
To what extent are successor regimes bound by prior regime law?
The Constitutional Court described the dilemma in terms of familiar
antinomies: the rule of law understood as predictability versus the rule of law
understood as substantive justice. So framed, the choices seemed irreconcilable;
the statute of limitations law and the proposed 1956-era prosecutions were held
unconstitutional. The principle of the rule of law required prospectivity in

38. See Zentenyi-Takacs Law, Law Concerning the Prosecutability of Offenses Between December
21, 1944 and May 2, 1990 (Nov. 4, 1991) (Hung.), translated in 1 J. CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 131
(1994) [hereinafter Zentenyi-Takacs Law]; see also Stephen Schulhofer et al., Dilemmas ofJustice, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Summer 1992, at 17.
39. See infra notes 46--49 and accompanying text.
40. See Zentenyi-Takacs Law, supra note 38.
41. Similar legislation reviving the time bars elapsing during the Communist regime was also enacted
elsewhere in the region, as in the Czech Republic. See Decision of Dec. 21, 1993, Const. Ct. Czech Rep.

(on file with Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, Univ. of Chicago) {upholding
Act No. 198/1993 Sb. Regarding the Lawlessness of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It)
[hereinafter Decision on Act. No. 198/1993 Sb.]. The problem of statute of limitations laws commonly
arises after long occupations when societies attempt to prosecute crimes committed under predecessor
regimes. Thus, in Western Europe, the rule-of-law problem posed by the passing of statutes of limitations
would not arise in the immediate postwar period, but only later in the 1960s. For discussion of Ocnnuny's
statute of limitations debate, see ADALBERT ROCKERL, THE INVESTIOATJON Of NAZI CRIMES 1945-1978,
at 53-55, 66--67 (1980). See also infra notes 136, 158.
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lawmaking, even if it meant the worst criminal offenses of the prior regime
would go unpunished. 42
The dominant vision of the rule of law for the Constitutional Court was
"security."43 "Certainty of the law demands . . . the protection of rights
previously conferred .... " 44 The proposed law, which would have opened
the way to ancien regime prosecutions, was classically ex post and as such
threatened individual rights to repose. In its discussion of the meaning of
security, the Court analogized the right of repose at issue to personal property
rights. Although protection of personal property rights could generally be
overridden by competing state interests, such interests, the Court maintained,
ought not override an individual's criminal process rights to repose. By
protecting the rule-of-law value of "security" from invasion by the state, the
Constitutional Court sent an important message that property rights would be
protected in the transition.
In ordinary times, the idea of the rule of law as security in the protection
of individual rights is frequently considered to be a threshold, minimal
understanding of the rule of law basic to liberal democracy.~s Yet in the
economic and legal transitions of Eastern and Central Europe, this
understanding represents a profound transformation. If the totalitarian legal
system abolished or ignored the line between the individual and the state, the
line drawn by the Hungarian Court posited a new constraint on the state: an
individual right of security. Insistence on the protection of individual rights,
said to be previously acquired, was constructed in the transition. This sent an
important message that the new regime would be more liberal than its
predecessor.
Compare a second case. In its second round of successor cases in this
century, Germany's judiciary once again confronted the transitional rule-of-law
dilemma when East German border guards were put on trial for Berlin Wall
shootings that occurred prior to Unification. 46 The question before the Court
was whether to recognize defenses that relied upon predecessor regime law.~ 7
42. The opinion begins with a statement of the Coun·s characteriz.auon of the dilemma It confronted
"The Constitutional Coun is the repository of the paradox of 1he ·revolution of the rule of law
Constitutional Coun of the Hungarian Republic Resolution No. 11/1992 (111.5) AB. rrans/aud m I J
CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 129, 138 (1994). Why a paradox? .. Rule of law," the Coun said. means
"predictability and foreseeability." Id. at 141. .. From the principle of predictabilny and foresccab1h1y, the
criminal Jaw's prohibition of the use of re1roactive legislation, especially ex post facto . directly
follows .... Only by following the fonnalized legal procedure can there be \'alid law . . ."Id. at 14J-i2.
43. See id. at 142 ("The cenainty of the Jaw based on fonnal and objecll\'e pnnc1ples 15 more
important than necessarily partial and subjective justice.").
44. Id. at 136.
45. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTII1JTION OF LIBERTY 19-21 (1960).
46. On the legal and political changes in pos1-Commun151 Gennany. see generally GER.\IA.'i
UNIFICATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Gaines Post. Jr. ed., 1992); and Wiktor Os1a1ynskl. Rn·olu11ons
in Eastern Europe. 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1991).
47. According to the fonner Gennan Democratic Republic's Border Pro1ec11on Law. soldiers were
authorized to shoot in response to acts of unlawful border crossing. The custom at the border was to
enforce the Jaw strictly. Supervisors emphasized that a breach of the border should be prevented -m all
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The Berlin Trial Court framed the dilemma in terms of the tension between
"formal law" and "justice," and rejected former East German law because not
everything is right which is law. 48 Comparing the Communist laws to those
of the Nazi period, the Court relied on postwar precedents holding that evil
legislation lacked the status of law: "Especially the time of the National
Socialist regime in Germany taught that ... in extreme cases the opportunity
must be given for one to value the principle of material justice more highly
than the principle of legal certainty ...." 49 Procedurally, legal rights were
distinct from moral rights. Characterized as "extreme cases," the border guards
cases were analogized to those of the postwar collaborators and accordingly
guided by the same adjudicative principle.
The transitional courts of Eastern and Central Europe, despite facing
different legal issues, face a problem common to successor regimes: What are
the rule-of-law implications of prosecuting for actions that were legal under the
prior regime? As the earlier postwar debate suggests, this question really raises
two questions, one about the legitimacy of law in both predecessor and
successor periods, and another about the relation between the two. The
juxtaposition is always between the rule of law as settled norms versus the rule
of law as transformative. In the contemporary cases, as in the postwar debate,
what emerges are new transitional understandings of the rule of law.
Considered together, the two decisions present an interesting puzzle. For the
Berlin court, the controlling rule-of-law value was what was "morally" right,
whereas for the Hungarian Court the controlling rule-of-law value was
protection of preexisting "legal" rights. 50 In one case, the rule of law requires
security understood as prospectivity, with the consequence of forbearance in
the criminal law. In the other view, justice is understood as equal enforcement
of the law. Can the two cases be reconciled?
Probing the language of the successor cases exposes a conception of the
rule oflaw peculiar to the transitional moment. Judicial rhetoric conceptualizes
cases and, if necessary, by all means." See Border Guards Prosecution Case, Bundesgerichtshof [BGHJ
(F.R.G.), translated in JOO l.L.R. 366, 370 (1995) (citing to Border Law (former G.D.R.)).
48. As the trial court stated:
In an examination of the question of whether it is permissible to threaten with death and, when
necessary, even to kill the person who does not want to obey the prohibition on leaving, and
who-disregarding it-wants to cross the border, the question presents itself whether everything
is right that is formally and interpretatively considered a right.
Judgment of Jan. 20, 1992, Landgericht [LG] (Berlin), 13 JURISTEN ZEITUNO 691, 692 (1992) (F.R.G.);
see also Judgment of Oct. 24, 1996, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGEJ (F.R.G.) <http:www.unlwuerzburg.de/glaw/bvr94185.html> (visited Mar. 26, 1997) {"The violation is so serious that it violates the
legal convictions common to all nations regarding the value and dignity of the human being. For such a
case, positive Jaw must give way to justice.").
49. Judgment of Jan. 20, 1992, Landgericht [LG] (Berlin), 13 JURISTEN ZEITUNO at 693 (quoting
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 3, 232 (1953) (F.R.G.)).
50. In exploring the term Rechtstaat the Hungarian Court suggested that it was guided by German
understandings, but it did not appear to consider itself bound by the precedents informing the German
judiciary's understanding of the rule of law in "extreme cases." See Constitutional Court of the Hungarian
Republic Resolution No. 1111992 (ill.5) AB, translated in I J. CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 129 (1994).
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the problem in terms of multiple competing rule-of-law values in seemingly
intractable conflict: one value deemed relative, and the other essential. The
transitional judiciaries in these cases characterized the dilemma they confronted
as involving a balancing of two senses of the rule of law: the rule of law as
it is ordinarily understood versus a transformative understanding. Which of
these values will dominate the transitional balance will depend on distinctive
historical and political legacies. Accordingly, after totalitarianism, the dominant
vision of the rule of law in Hungary is to draw a thin line of positive security
upon which individuals can rely and which is beyond the reach of state power.
In unified Germany, the transitional rule of law is defined within a preexisting
jurisprudence, which continues to respond to legality under fascism. 51 After
Nazi rule, where a repressive security apparatus functioned outside the law and
the legal machinery was itself used to persecute, the dominant sense of the rule
of law was of equal protection in the administration of justice. These are
transformative understandings.
Despite idealist theorizing to the contrary, the transitional precedents
suggest that no one rule-of-law value is essential in the movement toward
construction of a more liberal political system. Transcendent notions of rule-oflaw values in transitional societies depend in part on their distinctive political
legacies, and in particular, on the role of law in the predecessor regime. 52 The
meaning of the rule of law is contingent in nature and constructed in part in
relation to the social understanding of the response to injustice. 53 Whereas the
51. When the Geiman judiciary ruled that the border guard case constirnted an "extreme case:· 11
analogized Communist rule to that of National Socialism. In this way, the legal response to World Wai II
injustice continued to guide contemporary adjudication in the 1rans1uons out of Communist rule. As m the
postwar period, the Court invoked overriding principles of natural law. Su supra notes 31, 34, 35, and
accompanying text.
52. There has been a lively scholarly debate on this question, and recent comparau\"e work conccnung
the role of adjudication under repressive rule in Gennany under Nazi con1rol, Laun Amenca under m1htary
rule, and South Africa under apartheid rule. Despite substantial theonzing about the potential role of
positivist and natural Jaw adjudicative principles under prior tyrannical rule, to the extent that there has
been empirical study of the judiciary's role in repressive periods, neither principle of adJud1cauon appears
to correlate with greater rule of Jaw in such periods. In varying contexts, schol:irs ha\"e concluded 1ha1
variations in interpretive s!Ialegies whether of posith'ist or natural law do not well explain the JUd1c1ary's
role under repressive rule.
Compare MOLl.ER, supra note 31, at 68, 71-73 (claiming Ni!Zl Judges' fn:c-rangmg pnnc1ple of
interpretation Jed to support of repressive rule), with Dubber, supra note 31, al 1819-20, 1825 (ob~r...-mg
that jurisprudence of this era included positivism, particularly where understood as ~pa.muon of law and
morality). For a thoughtful discussion, see Symposium, Nazis in the Co1mroom: Lessons from the Conduct
of Lawyers and Judges Under the Laws of rlre Third Reich and Vichy France, 61 BROOK. L REY 1121.
1142-45 (1995). For a discussion regarding South Africa, sec DAVID D"iZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED
LEGAL SYSTEMS: Soura AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY ( 1991 ); and STEPHEN
ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992)

For a discussion of the Latin American judiciary's interpretive s!Ialegies, sec Mark J Os1cl, Dialogue w11h
Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 481 (1995).
53. The transitional perspective on the meaning of the rule of law urged here sheds hghl on the
puzzling gulf between American and Continental philosophers over the pulllli\"e assocmuons of vanous
legal philosophies with repression and, conversely, with liberal rule. The fact that pos1Uv1Sm IS assocmted
with repression or liberal rule on opposite sides of the ocean suggests n contingent and 1ransiuonal response
to its use by evil judges. In the United States, positivism IS frequently associated wnh Junsprudcncc
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conventional understanding of the conception of tyranny is the lack of rule of
law as arbitrariness, the transitional rule of law in the modern cases illuminates
a distinctive normative response to contemporary tyranny. 54 Where
persecution was systematically perpetrated under legal imprimatur,55 the
transitional legal response is the attempt to undo these abuses under the law.

C. Transitional Constructions of Legality
The above discussion leads to a more differentiated understanding of the
rule of law in two senses, ordinary and extraordinary, and it illuminates an
understanding oflegality that is distinctively transitional. These understandings
of the rule of law bridge the discontinuity from illiberal to liberal rule; as such,
one might consider these values and processes to mediate the transition. I focus
on three such mediating concepts in the discussion that follows. These are the
social construction of the rule of law, the role of international law in
transcending domestic legal understandings, and, finally, the core rule of law
value: to transcend the passing politics of the time.

1. The Role of Social Construction
One mediating concept of the transitional rule of law is its social
construction. What matters in establishing the rule of law is legal culture, not
abstract or universal ideals of justice.56 The socially constructed
understanding of the transitional rule of law is evident in the post-Communist
adjudications. In the border guards case,57 the prevailing social understanding
of law was used to justify the rejection of prior legal defenses. The validity of
prior law depended on the social practices of the time, such as the norm's
publication and transparency.58 "In the then-GDR, too, justice and humanity
upholding a slavery regime, whereas in Gennany it is not positivism but natural law interpretation that is
associated with the Reich judiciary. For a comparison of the American and English approaches, sec
Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REY. 2054, 2055 (1995); for an analysis of
jurisprudence under a slavery regime, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 26-29, 121-23 (1975);
for a discussion regarding Nazi jurisprudence, see MOLLER, supra note 31.
54. From its inception in the ancient understanding tenned "isonomy,'' the idea of the rule of law
emerges in response to tyranny. In ancient times, isonomy is forged in response to tyranny understood as
arbitrary and partial enforcement of the law. Because prior tyranny is associated with lawmaking that is
both arbitrary and unequal, the ancient understanding of rule of law comprehended both values of security
in the law and equal enforceability of the Jaw. As in ancient times, the contemporary idea of rule of Jaw
is forged in the context of the move from repressive to more liberalizing rule. For an account of the history,
see F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 162-75 (1960). For an intellectual history of the German
Rechtstaat, see STEVEN B. SMITH, HEGEL'S CRmQUE OF LIBERALISM 145-48 (1989).
55. For a related discussion of tyranny in the fonn of systemic persecution, beyond the protection of
the law, see JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND PoLmCAL TRIALS 126-27 (1964).
56. See HENRY w. EHRMANN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 48-50 (1976); James L. Gibson &
Gregory A. Caldeira, 171e Legal Cultures of Europe, 30 L. & Soc'y REV. 55, 55-62 (1996).
57. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
58. On one such articulation of the conditions for law, see Fuller, supra note 23, at 638-43. See also
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were illustrated and represented as ideals. In this respect, generally sufficient
conceptions of the basis of a natural lawfulness were set out."59 The border
policy, which was generally secret and covered up whenever foreigners were
in the country, lacked the transparency ordinarily associated with law. 60 The
guards stood at a geographical and juridical border. This treatment signaled an
illegitimacy of regulation of the border in its legal culture. A similar concern
animated Hungary's Constitutional Court when it emphasized the rule-of-law
value of security as continuity in the law. In the transitional context of political
upheaval, the judiciary constructed the understanding of legal continuity. The
perception of rule of law is created by the Court's own adherence to
procedure.61
What makes law positive? Prevailing theorizing about the rule of law
posits that among the conditions for law is that it be known. 62 Is knowledge
of law equated with publication? In transitional periods, there is commonly a
large gap between the law as written and as perceived. What makes law
positive is the popular perception in the public sphere. This understanding
broadens, indeed democratizes, sources of legality with societal involvement
in the construction of legal culture. Indeed, in the contemporary media age, at
any one time there may well be multiple sources of law, as well as numerous
forms of publication, that overshadow the written law. 63 Social understanding
in the public sphere is a rule of recognition by which to evaluate the legal
systems of illiberal regimes, an understanding of law that stands independent
of the sovereign's decrees and as such is less affected by political upheaval.
Guided by this mediating principle of transitional legality, the legitimacy of
predecessor regime law would depend on popular understandings of legality
in the ambient culture.
Understanding the rule of law as socially constructed offers a principle for
evaluating legality in periods of movement between dictatorships and
democracies. Recognition of a legitimacy gap between the law as written and
as socially perceived offers a useful way to explain law's construction under
illiberal rule. Indeed, as public belief in prevailing political systems wanes, one
might expect this gap to widen, leading to the transition.

JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TuEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM
(1970) (providing systematic effon to specify conditions for law).
59. Judgment of Jan. 20, 1992, Landgericht [LG) (Berlin), 13 JUR!STEN ZErnmo 691. 69S (1992)
(F.R.G.).
60. See id. The Coun found not only that the border policy did not compon v.ith the prevailing social
understanding of law, but also that the prior understanding of law was consonant v.ith that of the West.
61. See supra note 42.
62. See RAZ, supra note 12, at 214; see also Fuller, supra note 23.
63. See generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW CO~L'ION SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITTON (1995) (articulating theory of law in light of dynamic
Jaw/society relation).
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The Role of International Law

Another mediating concept of the transitional rule of law is international
law. International law posits institutions and processes that transcend domestic
law and politics. In periods of political flux, international law offers an
alternative construction of law that, despite substantial political change, is
continuous and enduring. Local courts rely upon these international
understandings. The potential of this understanding of international law gained
force in the postwar period.64 In the contemporary moment, international law
is frequently invoked as a way to bridge shifting understandings of legality. In
the post-Communist cases discussed above, the controversy over the attempt
to revive old political prosecutions was ultimately resolved by turning to
concepts of international law. For example, in its review of a law proposing
to reopen political cases relating to the 1956 uprising, the Constitutional Court
of Hungary reasoned that reopening such cases was discontinuous with prior
law. 65 In a second round of judicial review, the Court upheld a new statute
authorizing 1956 prosecutions based upon offenses constituting "war crimes"
and "crimes against humanity" under international law.66 The rule of law
required continuity. Such continuity was considered to exist in international
legal norms, 67 for such norms overrode domestic .law. 68 Throughout the
64. A jurisprudential debate arose, particularly in the United States, over whether postwar trials
convened at Nuremberg and Tokyo were in keeping with the rule of law. International law served as n
mediating concept to mitigate the dilemma of the rule of law raised by successor justice In transitional
times, and to justify the legality of the Nuremberg Trials against concerns over retroactivlty. See Hnns
Kelsen, The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War Criminals, ]UDOB
ADVOCATE J., Fall-Winter 1945, at 8, 8-12, 46 (discussing nature of jurisdiction of Nuremberg Tribunal
and other postwar trials); Bernard D. Meltzer, Comment, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg
Debate, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 455, 457 (1947) (''The strict and automatic application of the rule ngnlnst
retroactivity to an undeveloped legal system [such as international law] would, of course, hnve widened
the gap between the developing moral sense of the community and its lagging legal institutions."). See
generally Stanley L. Paulsen, Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFP. 132 (1975)
(arguing that Nuremberg Tribunal's rejection of Nazi defenses was justified by its rejection of classicnl
legal positivism); Quincy Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. Im'L L. 405
(1948) (arguing that criticism of Nuremberg Trials as applying ex post facto law is rooted In critics'
positivistic theory of international law).
65. Such discontinuity, the Constitutional Court said, threatened the understanding of legality In the
successor period; there was no principled way to break selectively with prior law. The "legitimncy of tho
different (political) systems during the past half-century is irrelevant . . . ; from the viewpoint of tho
constitutionality of laws it does not comprise a meaningful category." Constitutional Court of the Hungnrinn
Republic Resolution No. 11/1992 (ill.5) AB, translated in I J. CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 129, 136
(1994).
66. See Act on Procedures Concerning Certain Crimes Committed During the 1956 Revolution, Feb.,
1993 (Hung.) (on file with Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, Univ. of Chicago).
67. Applicable international law included the postwar Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Oenevn
Convention], and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes nnd
Crimes Against Humanity, adopted and opened for signature Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into
force Nov. II, 1970).
68. See Resolution of the Hungarian Constitutional Court of Oct. 12, 1993 on the Justice Lnw (Case
53/1993) (on file with Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, Univ. of Chlcngo). The
notion that international law took precedence over domestic law was by no means clear, as Hungary's
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region, international law would become the basis for punishment policies
because these norms transcended the politicized law of the past regime. In
another border guards case, the judgment holding actions unlawful explicitly
rests on international law.69
In periods of political flux, international law offers a useful mediating
concept. The framing of the rule-of-law dilemma easily shifts from the
antinomies of positivism and natural law to those of national and international
law. Grounded in positive law, but incorporating values of justice associated
with natural law, international law mediates the rule-of-law dilemma.Jo
Moreover, in its normative circumscription of the most heinous abuses,
international law offers a source of normative transcendence.J 1 Whereas
international law preserves the ordinary understanding of the rule of law as
settled law, it also enables transformation. In so doing, it mediates the
transition. 72

3. The Rule of Law as Antipolitics
Above, I suggested that the defining feature of the rule of law in periods
of political change is that it preserves some degree of continuity in legal forms,
while it enables normative change. The previous politicized nature of law and
adjudication partially justifies nonadherence during the transition. This
understanding of the rule of law as antipolitics is a common theme throughout
Constitution was silent on the relative priorities of domestic and international law. The Coun suggested 11
would interpret the Constitution guided by international norms, declaring that Mgcnerally n:cogmzcd rules
of international law" took precedence. See A MAGYAR KOZTARsASAG Al.KontANYA [Consutuuon) an. 7,
cl. 1 (Hung.) ('The legal system of the Republic of Hungary ... harmonises the internal laws and statutes
of the country with the obligations assumed under international law."). The constitutions of other countries
explicitly provide for such priority ranking. See, e.g .• SYNTAGMA DES HEU.ADOS [CollSlituuon) an. 28, cl.
1 (Greece) (declaring that rules of international law shall pre\•ail O\'er contraJy domesuc law).
69. See Border Guards Prosecution Case, Bundesgerichtshof [BGHJ (F.R.G.), rran.s/ared m 100 I.LR.
366, 380-82 (1995) (relying on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for srgnarure
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), to hold that domcsuc order 1nfnnged
human rights protected by international treaty); see also Krisztina Morvai, Rerroacm·e Jusrice Based on
International Law: A Recent Decision by rlre Hungarian Consrirurzonal Coun. E. EUR. CosST. REV .. Fall
1993/\Vmter 1994, at 33; Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Commmed m Albarua During
Communist Rule for Political, Ideological and Religious Motives, rranslared in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA app. A (1996) (establishing basis for prosecuting former
Communists).
70. See Statute of the International Coun of Justice, Oct 24, 1945. an. 38(1). 59 Stat. 1031. Pos11ive
international law norms are defined in conventions, treaties, and customs. For an account of the pos1U\1St
understanding, see OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICC 35-36 ( 1991). The
role of custom in the formation of international law is described in Michael Akchurst. Cusrom as a Source
of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. IITT'L L 1 (1974-75).
For a related discussion regarding elements of natural and positivist law prescm in mternauonal law.
see SHKLAR, supra note SS, at 126-28.
71. An illustration is the concept of crimes against humanity, suggesung conceptually opposite and
yet related values, in the universalized normative response to pcrsccuuon ep11om1zmg absolute evil. Su
J.M. Balkin, Nesred Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990) (book n:\•iew); see also rnfra Pan II.
72. International law principles surface in reconciling the threshold dilemma of law m pcnods of
political transformation. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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the contemporary transitional controversies discussed above. The border guards
trial was characterized as an "extreme case," justifying departure from ordinary
rule-of-law considerations. 73 The Gennan Court elevated what was morally
right over the political. Other cases in the region suggest similar judicial
interpretations of the rule of law. Hungary's invalidation of the 1956
prosecutions law presented a limit on politicized anti-Communist policies. 74
If under repressive rule the administration of justice was conducted purely as
an exercise of political will,75 this understanding is most clearly disavowed
when the successor regime adopts the overriding rule-of-law value that most
clearly expresses a principled nonnative vision, independent of transitory
politics.
The construction of the transitional rule of law as independent of politics
shares certain affinities with the understanding of the rule of law applicable in
ordinary times. Yet controversies over transitional justice in highly politicized
contexts present hard cases for adherence to the rule of law. Despite radical
political change, the rule of law is law not primarily motivated by politics.
Transitional jurisprudence reveals a shining vision of the rule of law as
antipolitics.
D. The Transitional Judiciary

In periods of political transfonnation, the problem of legality is distinct
from the problem of the theory of law as it arises in established democracies
in ordinary times. There is a working out of core questions about the
legitimacy of the new regime, including the nature and role of the transitional
judiciary. The choice of principles of adjudication implies a related question
about where, as an institutional matter, the work of transformation should lie:
judiciary or legislature? This is the question to which I now turn.
The transitional justice dilemma arises during periods of substantial
political change. When a legal system is in flux, the challenge to ordinary
understandings of the rule of law is surely at its greatest. This was less true of
postwar transitions than of the more contemporary movements from
Communist rule, periods of simultaneous economic, political, and legal
transformation. In these periods, newly founded constitutional courts have

73. See Judgment of Jan. 20, 1992, Landgericht [LG] (Berlin), 13 JURISTEN ZBITUNO 691, 693 (1992)
(F.R.G.).
74. See supra note 65. In evaluating a law that would have extended the time for prosecution of crimes
committed under prior rule, the Czech Constitutional Court upheld it on the basis that it would serve the
goal of undoing the past politicized punishment policy and administration of justice. The law would
suspend the time limitations for 41 years (the time between February 25, 1948 and December 29, 1989)
for acts not previously prosecuted or punished for "political reasons." See Decision on Act No. 198/1993
Sb, supra note 41.
75. For an account of the nature of such decisionmaking in illiberal political systems see the discussion
of decisionism in CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THBOLOOY 53-66 (George Schwab trans., 1985).
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borne an institutional burden of establishing new understandings of the rule of
law. 76 It could be questioned whether continuity with the prior regime is a
determination properly for the transitional judge, or a political question
properly subject to broader public debate. When this question arose in the
contemporary post-Communist transitions, the judiciary assumed the
decisionmaking responsibility. This issue began as a political question in
unified Germany, but in its consideration of the question of the validity of
German Democratic Republic (GDR) law in the border guards cases, the Berlin
court elided the political agreement of the two Germanys.77 In so doing, the
Court demonstrated its independence from the legislature and its political
agenda.78 Similarly, when Hungary's Constitutional Court overturned the
1956 prosecutions law, it sent a similar message of independence to the
country's political branches.79 These decisions reveal a core understanding of
rule of law forged by a transitional judiciary striving for independence from
politics.
Political theorists often distinguish liberal from illiberal regimes by their
constitutions; the role of transitional constitutionalism is discussed more
extensively in Part III. Yet the central factor distinguishing liberal political
systems seems to depend less on the specifics of any one institutional
arrangement, and more on the degree to which there is a sense of meaningful
enforcement and understanding of the rule of law. Although the Communistera constitutions enumerated rights, these were largely rights on paper that
were rarely enforced. Therefore, after Communism, merely enacting new rights
charters would not produce a sense of transformation in the rule of law.
Responding to this distinctive legacy of injustice are the dozen constitutional
courts that seek to enforce the new states' constitutions.so This transformative
role for the judiciary is a "critical" legal response that affirmatively signals a
turn toward the constitutional systems of liberal democracies. 81

76. For description of the beginnings of this de\•clopmcnt. sec Herman Schwanz. 771e New East
European Constitulional Courts, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 741 (1992). The burden of 1ransforma11on 10 a ruleof-law system has to some extent devolved on the judiciary. chiefly the new constituuonal couns Su Ruu
Teitel, Post-Communist Consrirurionalism: A Transitional Puspecm·e. 26 COUJM HVM RTS L Rl:-v 167
(1994). For a wide-ranging collection of essays on East European consutuuonal couns, sec
CONSTITVTIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE (Irena GrudziJ\ska-Gros.s cd, 199-i) A similar
transformative response can be seen in other recent transitions, such as that m South Afnca. South Afnca's
transitional Constitution creates its new constitutional Coun. Su S. AFR. CONST. ch. VU (1993)
77. The Unification Treaty contemplated continuity in former GDR crirmnal law, providing that East
Germany's criminal code should be applied to criminal acts commiued before uruficauon. However, the
Court rejected the border guards' defenses grounded in GDR law Su Judgment of Jan 20. 1992.
Landgericht [LG] (Berlin), 13 JURISTEN ZEITUNG at 694.
78. However, the transformative response to the pohucal was less necessary m umficd Germany than
elsewhere in the region because of the nature of the tr.msiuons.
79. See Constitutional Coun of the Hungarian Republic Rcsoluuon No. 11/1992 (lll 5) AB. translated
in I J. CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 129 (1994).
80. See Teitel, supra note 76, at 169-76.
81. For discussion of comparable transformat1\•e consutuuonal responses, sec infra noto 197-99,
277-79, and accompanying text.
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The constitutional courts assist in the transformation to rule-of-law systems
in a number of ways. First, the courts emerge out of systems of centralized
state power; as new forums specially created in the transformation, their very
establishment defines a break from past political arrangements. Second, access
to constitutional courts through litigation enables a form of participation in the
fledgling democracy. Over time, access to the courts could enable popular
input into constitutional interpretation, developing a societal understanding of
limited government and individual rights protection. Popular access to courts
for individual rights enforcement is a potent symbol of a new governmental
openness. 82 Third, to the extent the constitutional courts have explicit
mandates to engage in judicial review, they have become guardians of the new
constitutional order.83 They are active in interpreting constitutional norms
under prior constitutions, pursuant to general mandates to uphold the rule of
law. 84 The constitutional courts have the potential to delimit state power, and
to redefine individual rights, thus creating a rights culture. Through
transformative adjudication, the transitional judiciary deploys activist principles
of judicial review toward normative change and a more liberal rule-of-law
system.
Transformative adjudicatory practices raise a crucial question: Insofar as
the transitional judiciary bears the burden of the transformation of the rule of
law, to what extent are such practices compatible with the role of the judiciary
in established democracies? In democracies in ordinary times, activist judicial
decisionmaking is generally considered illegitimate. This is so largely for two
reasons. First, retroactivity in judicial decisionmaking challenges the rule of
law as settled law.85 Second, judicial originality is thought to interfere with
democracy; unlike legislative decisionmaking, judicial decisionmaking lacks
the legitimacy associated with democratic processes. 86 To what extent are
these objections relevant to adjudication in transitional times?
Our intuitions about who ought to make law depend upon implicit
assumptions about democracy and democratic accountability that ought not be
automatically applied to illiberal regimes, nor to regimes beginning to move
away from such rule. In established democracies in ordinary times, our

82. See Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary's Transition from Communism to Democracy:
Tlze Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 41, 62 (discussing remarkable access implied by Hungary's permissive standing rules). While Hungary
offers the broadest access, it is not alone in the region in contemplating participation in constitutional
litigation by political actors.
83. In much of the region, broad jurisdictional rules allow abstract judicial review, and access to
review by political actors, such as the president or minority factions of the legislature. See Teitel, supra
note 76, at 186-87.
84. A good example is the Hungarian Constitutional Court's review of the 1956 prosecutions law. See
Constitutional Court of the Hungarian Republic Resolution No. 11/1992 (III.5) AB, tra11slated in 1 J.
CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 129 (1994).
85. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 6, at 84.

86. See id. at 84, 138.

1997]

Transitional Jurisprudence

2033

intuitions are that transfonnative lawmaking should occur by legislation rather
than adjudication. The judiciary is constrained from creating law, for such
lawmaking is considered a departure from the general predicate of democracy,
majoritarian lawmaking. 87 In transitional times, the problem of illegality is far
more prevalent, indeed pervasive. Periods of political transfonnation are
frequently accompanied by radical legal change. The most recent wave of
political change correlating with economic transfonnation implied a major
overhaul of preexisting law. The conventional concern of the absence of
democratic accountability posed by judicial lawmaking seems less apt in
periods of political flux. In such periods, the transitional legislature frequently
is not freely elected and, further, lacks the experience and legitimacy of the
legislature operating in ordinary times. 88
A second reason why the judiciary is not generally seen as the proper
lawmaking body is its lack of institutional competence and capacity. This
concern was raised, for example, in the postwar debate over the rule of law.89
In the positivist position, the burden of legal transformation was thought
properly to fall upon the legislature, while the natural law position assumed a
transfonnative role for adjudication. Yet the posti.var debate did not take
account of the transitional context. As periods of political change are also
periods of legal flux, controversies in such times are often characterized by a
lack of relevant law. 90 Moreover, controversies in such extraordinary periods
often necessitate speedy considerations. While in ordinary times, making law
in a case-by-case fashion may well appear too slow and too variable, in
transitional times, judicial decisionmaking is often relatively faster than the
legislative process, which may be slowed down by a compromised past or
political inexperience. Moreover, in the context of political flux, the judiciary
may well be comparatively more competent for nuanced, case-by-case,
resolution of transitional controversies. 91 Indeed, judicial decisionmaking
allows for substantial change, and for what I have characterized as the
ambivalent directionality of the law in such periods.

87. On the traditional paradigm of the judiciary, see generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, CoURTS: A
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981 ). Cf l\1AURO CAPPEU.E1TI. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 31-34 (1989) (observing that judges necessarily "make law" by micrprcung
it, but distinguishing this function from that of legislators, who act in procedurally disunct manner). For
classic statements regarding the role of the judiciary in democracy. sec generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL.
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1962); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIOSAL
PoLmCAL PROCESS (1980); and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND OISTitUST (1980).
88. During the initial political shift, transitional parliaments arc generally ''cstigcs of the pnor
repressive period. See Andrew Arato, Dilenvnas Arising from tilt Poll'tr to Creare Cons11tur1ons m Eastern
Europe, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 661, 674-75 (1993).
89. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
90. For a discussion relating Russia's current plight to the absence of conccntra1cd staic power. sec
Stephen Holmes, Can Weak-State Liberalism Survive? (Spring 1997) (paper presented at Colloquium on
Constitutional Theory, N.Y. University School of Law, on file with author).
91. See Teitel, supra note 76, at 182-85.
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Finally, transfonnative adjudication is self-regarding. By changing
adjudicatory principles and practices, institutions compromised by their
decisionmaking under prior rule can transform themselves. In high-profile
cases, a compromised judiciary can transform itself by drawing the line on past
precedent and changing its principle of adjudication. This self-regarding
institutional mechanism is particularly pertinent where the judiciary supported
prior repressive rule. 92 Where the judiciary is not the successor to a
compromised institution, there are other beneficial legitimating implications of
transfonnative adjudication.
Theories of adjudication associated with understandings of the rule of law
in ordinary times are inapposite to transitional periods. Our ordipary intuitions
about the nature and role of adjudication relate to presumptions about the
relative competence and capacities of judiciaries and legislatures in ordinary
times that simply do not hold in unstable periods. Indeed, the cases discussed
above illuminate an extraordinary role for courts exercising principles of
transfonnative adjudication. In periods of political change, the very concerns
· for legitimacy and democracy that ordinarily constrain activist adjudication
may well support such adjudication as an alternative to more politicized uses
of the law.
E. The Transformative Adjudicative Domain
I began this Part by positing that there is a special dilemma in adherence
to the rule of law in periods of political change. The ordinary understanding
of the rule of law as adherence to settled law is in tension with transfonnative
understandings of the rule of law. I now consider what nonnative rule-of-law
principles are associated with adjudication in periods of political change.
In these extraordinary periods, as discussed above, rule-of-law norms do
not constitute universals. The tensions posed by adherence to the rule of law
in these periods are reconciled through a number of mediating concepts.
Legality in such periods is socially constructed; in some part, it is judge-made.
Exploration of the precedents in such periods suggests that understandings of
the rule of law are constructed within a transitional context. By cabining
politicized uses of the law, this principle of legal decisionmaking defines an
interim postrevolutionary space on the road to democracy.
Recognizing a domain of transfonnative adjudication during periods of
political transition has significant implications for prevailing legal theory about
the rule of law. First, recognition of such a domain throws into relief the
extent to which prevailing legal theory has failed to take account of the

92. See, e.g., MOLLER, supra note 31, at 201-98 (discussing compromised judiciary in postwar
Germany); cf, e.g., Osiel, supra note 52 (discussing alternative strategies of judiciary under repressive Latin
American rule).

1997]

Transitional Jurisprudence

2035

significance of varying nonnative understandings of the rule of Jaw manifested
in transitional, as opposed to ordinary, times. Further, the transitional rule of
law poses an implicit critique of the dominant theories regarding the nature and
role of Jaw. In the dominant liberal position, lawmaking through adjudication
is conceived as somehow neutral and autonomous from politics. 93 These
liberal understandings are challenged by accounting for circumstances
associated with a role for transformative law, where the rule of Jaw is defined
in constructive relation to politics past.
The domain of transformative adjudication may pose a more serious
challenge to critical theorizing of Jaw. Critical legal theorizing has been
criticized for going too far in collapsing Jaw and politics. As such. this
theoretical approach has lacked explanatory power for why, or in what
circumstances, law has any distinctive claim on society. Although critical legal
theorizing has laid claims to a diminished rule of Jaw as a general matter.cu
the above discussion suggests that this is most true in extraordinary political
circumstances. The transitional rule of Jaw clarifies a place and a role for
hyperpoliticized adjudication. From the perspective of critical legal theory, the
challenge posed by the transfonnative adjudicative domain discussed here is
the challenge posed by the boundedness of law's political action. 95
Recognition of this domain reveals how the jurisprudence of these periods
shapes the transition. Nonnative understandings of the role of Jaw vary, not
unsurprisingly, with political circumstances. Within transitional democracies,
therefore, there is a place and a role for bounded political judgment.
Beyond adjudicatory practices, normative change constructive of a new
legality is also effected though other forms of Jaw. Criminal sanctions,
ordinarily limited to punishing individual wrongdoing, play a broader role
during transitions in challenging the legitimacy of past rule. These legal
responses sanction and delimit abuses of past state power. In the next Part, I
tum to the uses of criminal justice in transformative periods.
II.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Transitional justice is commonly linked in the public imagination with
criminal justice and the trials of ancien regimes. 96 The enduring symbols of

93. This is a longstanding precept of the rule of law m liberal poliucal theory, ruMtng from Fncdrich
Hayek lo the present. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6; FUUER, wpra note 19; HAYEK,
supra note 19; LIBERALISM AND IBE GOOD, supra note 6.
94. See PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SE!ZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 4-S (1978); THE
PoLmcs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982), Oa\•id M. Trubck. Tummg Away from
Law?, 82 MICH. L. REV. 824, 825 (1984).
95. On critical legal theory, see supra nolC 7. For explorauon of the idea of the rule of law from the
perspectives of liberalism and critical legal theory. sec generally ANDREW ALTMAN. CRITICAL LEOAL
STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRmQUE (1990).
96. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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the English and French revolutions from monarchic to republican rule are the
trials of Kings Charles I and Louis XVI. A half-century after the events, the
monument to the Nazis' defeat in World War II remains the Nuremberg
Trials.97 Greece's trials of its colonels represents the triumph of democracy
over military rule in Central Europe. 98 Argentina's junta trial marked the end
of decades of repressive rule throughout Latin America. 99
Successor trials dominate our understanding of justice in transitional
periods. The harshest form of law has an impact of symbolic dimensions
extending far beyond its incidence. Criminal justice is thought to play a
foundational role in the political transition. The claim is that trials can create
a new sense of legal order; that in the move to more liberal democracy, trials
can serve as foundations.
The notion of trials as foundations for liberalizing political change derives
from longstanding practices linking such legal responses to the postwar
justification for state violence. 100 In trials going back to the Middle Ages, the
tyranny of monarchic regimes is captured in the unjust war. 101 Law's role is
to express the justice of the successor regime. Thus, attribution of criminal
responsibility to prior political leadership for waging unlawful war, or other
analogous acts of state, is the thread running through the ancient successor
trials of the city-state tyrants described by Aristotle, the trials of Kings Charles
I and Louis XVI, the Nuremberg Trials, and more recent successor trials. 102
Contemporary political theorizing frequently justifies successor trials by
relating criminal law enforcement to societal prospects for consolidating
democracy. This version of the consequentialist argument is grounded in the
rule of law. 103 Successor trials are thought to advance transformation by
drawing a line between regimes, through processes that simultaneously
delegitimate the predecessor and legitimate the successor regimes. 104 The
trials of Kings Charles I and Louis XVI and the Nuremberg Trials have been
characterized as foundational political acts: "Revolutionaries must settle with
the old regime: that means they must find some ritual process through which
97. See infra text accompanying notes Ill, 113-21.
98. See infra note 163.
99. See supra note I; infra note 131, 162.
100. See MICHAEL wALZER, ]UST AND UNJUST wARS 289-90 (1977).
101. See ]AMES TuRNER JOHNSON, ]UST WAR TRADmON AND THI! Rl!sTRAINT OP WAR 121-71
(1981); WALZER, supra note 100, at 22-25; Paul Ramsey, The Just War According to St. Augustine, i11 JUST
WAR THEORY 8-22 (Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., 1992); see also M. Campbell Smith, /11troduct/011 to
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 23-24 (M. Campbell Smith trans., Macmillan Co. 1903) (1795).
102. See infra notes IOS-07, 109-10 and accompanying text.
103. Successor trials have been defended along these grounds: "(P]olitical trials may actually serve

liberal ends, where they promote legalistic values in such a way as to contribute to constitutional politics
and to a decent legal system." SHKLAR, supra note SS, at 14S. Similarly, Otto Kirchheimer has written of
the demand "for the construction of a permanent, unmistakable wall between the new beginnings and the
old tyranny." K!RCHHEIMER, supra note I, at 308.
I 04. For an exploration of the various justifications for successor trials, sec Ru ti Teitel, How Are the
New Democracies of the Southern Cone Dealing with the Legacy of Past Hwnan Rights Abuses? (Council
on Foreign Relations Discussion Paper) (May 17, 1990).
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the ideology it embodies . . . can be publicly repudiated. " 10~ Furthermore,
"the [King's] trial was an act of destruction as well as the vindication of a new
political doctrine; it represents the symbolic disenchantment of the realm as
well as the establishment of a secular republic." 106 The trials of kings
expressed the principle of equality under the law, instantiating the transition
from monarchy to republic.
Although successor trials are thought to play a distinctive foundational
role, this Article contends that the function of such trials is less foundational
than transitional. Trials offer a transitional mechanism for normative
transformation to express public condemnation of aspects of the past, as well
as public legitimation of the new rule of law. In particular, trials make it
possible to isolate and delegitimate an individual past and wrongdoing. When
societies move away from illiberal rule, the defining normative shift is in the
status and treatment of the individual; construction of social understandings of
individual responsibility chiefly occurs through the processes of criminal
justice. Through the individuation of responsibility, trials offer a mechanism
for recalling and disowning past wrongdoing, while confirming societal legal
processes and institutions. 107
Despite the claim that successor trials serve to establish more liberal
regimes, periods of political upheaval challenge the use of the criminal law for
normative purposes. Using trials to construct transition implies a profound
dilemma created by the tension of mediating discontinuity and continuity in the
law. Successor criminal trials are expected to lay the foundation of the
transition by expressing disavowal of predecessor norms, yet for such trials to
realize their normative potential, they must be prosecuted in keeping with the
full procedural legality associated with working democracies in ordinary times.
Otherwise, paradoxically, successor trials become vulnerable to challenge as
political justice, where they may even threaten the construction of a fledgling
liberal system. Thus, the attempt to use the criminal laws for normative change
ultimately culminates in an extraordinary partial criminal sanction, in the use
of criminal law primarily for its normative rather than punitive purposes. 103
A. The Dilemma of State Crimes but Individual Justice
Using trials to construct individual responsibility for persecution in periods
of political shifts raises a dilemma. There has long been an intuitive sense that

105. REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION: SPEECHES AT THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI, at 88 (M1chacl Walzer ed.
& Marian Rothstein trans., 1974).
106. Id.
107. For the classical arguments for punishment's role m expressing thts hbcral norm, sec GEORGE
P. FLETcHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); and H.L.A. HART. PUNISHME?>'T AND RESPONSWUJTY
(1968).

108. The nature of this transitional sanction is more fully discussed infra Sccuon 11.D

2038

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 2009

it is fair to ascribe responsibility to ancien regime leadership, linking up legal
and political understandings of responsibility. During transitions, justice has
generally been brought to bear against the top political leadership. 109
Historically, responsibility is commonly understood in terms of military
hierarchy and related principles of command responsibility. 110 Predicating
criminal responsibility upon the basis of military ideas of official responsibility
might be sensible in a postwar context, for political change often follows war.
Yet such shifts also occur in other ways; thus the military analogy does not
easily guide the broader question of successor justice. In particular, the
historical paradigm does not fully account for how to conceptualize individual
responsibility for wrongdoing perpetrated under repressive rule, and the extent
to which responsibility for past wrongdoing under illiberal regimes is fairly
attributable to top political leadership. Equating criminal liability with political
responsibility is foreign to penal concepts applicable in ordinary times; as a
political basis for prosecution, it poses a challenge to the rule of law.
B. The Nuremberg Paradigm Shift
While the historical paradigm attributed responsibility to the leadership of
the ancien regime, that standard changed with Nuremberg. The Nuremberg
Trials are commonly considered the archetypal case of successor criminal
justice in modern times. 111 Nuremberg's significance leads back to the failure
of trials after World War 1, 112 linked to the resurgence of German aggression
109. See REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION, supra note 105, at 4-7.
110. The military paradigm offers a way to conceptualize a regime's accountability. In the Jaw of war,

the principle of command responsibility affords a basis for attributing responsibility to superiors for
wrongdoing. This is reinforced by the Nuremberg principles that lift the defense of immunity from heads
of state. The extreme in status-based prosecutions after Nuremberg is illustrated in the Tokyo war crimes
trials, where the principle of command responsibility was broadly enforced. See Judgment in the Tokyo
War Crimes Trial, 1948, reprinted in part in CRIMES OF wAR: A LEGAL, POLmCAL-DOCUMENTARY, ANO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS ANO SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL
ACTS IN WARS 113 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1971); see also In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1946)
(concluding that charges against commander of Japanese forces "adequately allege" violation of law of
war).
In subsequent trials of high-ranking German army officers, the Yamashita standard was rejected, as
the courts insisted on knowledge and individual participation, or acquiescence in the criminal acts or
criminal neglect. See 11 TRIALS OF wAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 462 (U.S. v. von Leeb) (1948); id. at 1230 (U.S. v. List).
This version of the command responsibility principle would become enshrined in the international
legal conventions governing war. Failure to take measures to avert particular harm is proscribed by the
postwar Geneva Conventions. Explicitly rejecting Yamashita's should-have-known standard under Article
86 of the Conventions, knowledge triggers a duty to take "all feasible measures" to "prevent or repress the
breach." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 43, 16 l.L.M. 1391,
1428-29.

111. See SHKLAR, supra note 55, at 145.
112. Despite the Allies' attempt to obligate Germany to hold its war criminals accountable, few trials
were held, and there were virtually no convictions. For an account of these failed national trials, sec George
Gordon Battle, Tiie Trials Before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Gennans Accused of War Crimes, 8 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1921).
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and the advent of World War II. War-related guilt was said to prevent
transition to democracy: The failure of accountability signified the failure of
liberalization.
With Nuremberg, the paradigm of accountability shifts from national to
international processes and from the collective to the individual. After
Nuremberg, for the first time under international law, the response to
persecution implied delimiting state power through the concept of individual
responsibility. Prosecutions of past regime leaders effect this transformation.
The trial sanctions the past regime's wrongdoing, moving beyond the state to
the individual, and from political to legal judgment. 113 In the Nuremberg
Principles, 114 for the first time, responsibility for atrocities under international
law is attributed to the individual. 115 Under traditional military rules, "due
obedience" to orders was a defense, but under the Nuremberg Principles, even
those acting under orders of their superiors could be held responsible. 116
Furthermore, public officials could no longer avail themselves of a "head of
state" defense based on sovereign immunity, but instead could be held
criminally responsible. 117 By eliminating the "act of state" and "superior
orders" defenses, the Nuremberg Principles pierced the veil of diffused
responsibility for wrongdoing perpetrated under illiberal regimes. With the
challenge to traditional defenses to individual responsibility, potential
individual criminal liability for state wrongdoing was dramatically expanded.
These principles of criminal justice instantiate the core rule-of-law principle
of equal applicability of the law. 118
The strength of Nuremberg as precedent is not evident in international
trials a half-century later. Nevertheless, Nuremberg's real legacy is that it
spawned the dominant approach to state injustice. 119 How justice was done
I 13. By this account of Nuremberg, I mean its pm:cdcnual \'alue rather lh:in 1he basis for 1he warumc
proceedings as reflected in the contemporary undcrsl:lllding of accountabtlily for persccuuon. anti n:cord
of trials. See Symposium, 1945-1995 Critical Perspecm·es on tire Nuremberg Tnals and Stare
Accountability, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 453. 460-61 (1995).
114. The "Nuremberg Principles" formulaled after the ma! at the n:ques1 of 1he Unucd Nauons
General Assembly are the distillation of the Nuremberg judgment and cons1i1u1e a pl\'otal 1urrung pomt m
the conceptualization of individual responsibility for state crime. See lnremarional Lah· C011umssion: Report
on Principles of tire Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 51h Scss .. Supp. No. 12. at JI, U.N. Doc. Nl316

(1950).
115. See id. Principle I ("Any person who commits an act wluch cons111u1es a cnme under
international law is responsible therefor and liable 10 punishment").
116. See id. Principle IV ("The fact thal a person acled pursuanl to order of his Government or of a
superior does not relieve him from responsibility under intemat1onal law. pro\"ldcd a moral choice was m
fact possible to him.").
117. See id. Principle III ("The fact that a person who commlllcd an act which conslllutes a cnme
under international law acled as Head of Slate or responsible Go\'cmmcnt oflic1al docs not rchc\'e lum from
responsibility under international law.").
118. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95. Herc we see affmmes bct.,.-cen transitional
understandings of the rule of law and of criminal iusucc.
119. The first such international criminal proceedings occurred a half-century la1er. con,·cncd m the
Hague. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugosla\'la. an. S. annexed to Report of
the Secretary-General Pursua111 to Paragraph 2 of U.N. Security Council Resolu11on 81J8. U.N. GAOR.
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at Nuremberg has become virtually synonymous with successor justice. 120
Nuremberg's transformation of our understanding of individual responsibility
for grave state crimes implies a great potential for successor criminal justice.
Yet it also leads to the following dilemma: The Nuremberg Principles imply
a radical expansion of potential individual criminal liability, at both ends of the
power hierarchy, with no clear stopping point. 121 The Principles offer no
guidance for deciding among all those potentially liable whom to bring to trial.
The post-Nuremberg expansion in potential criminal liability raises a real
dilemma for successor regimes deliberating over whom to bring to trial and for
what offenses. After Nuremberg, what are the normative priorities in successor
punishment policy? How should individual criminal responsibility be conceived
in the attempt to use successor justice as the normative response to past evil?
As a practical matter, the vast numbers of persons implicated in modem
persecution, the scarcity of judicial resources in transitional societies, and the
frequently high political costs of successor trials result in few trials. 122 Given
these constraints, viable successor criminal justice has been furthered through
selective or exemplary trials. 123 Yet this approach to successor criminal
justice appears to revert back to the historical paradigm. 124 Selective
prosecutions targeting high officials threaten the liberal principle of individual

May 19, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1193-97 [hereinafter Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia].
120. Iniernational legal theory's perceived advantage in creating criminal accountability, combined
with the real advances of the immediate postwar period, have made the international law vocabulary the
dominant language of successor justice. The postwar period witnessed unprecedented successful multilateral
cooperation in the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the establishment of the United
Nations, as well as the passage of numerous conventions and resolutions regarding international crimes.
See Geneva Convention, supra noie 67; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted by U.N. Gen. Assembly Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951).
Early enthusiasm for international law's advances in normative development is now tempered by sober
reflection on the relative inefficiency of international mechanisms in dealing with atrocities. Despite
repealed calls for an international criminal court, or even the creation of criminal jurisdiction in the
International Court of Justice, to date, no such forum has been created. See generally James Crawford, The
/LC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 404 (1995) (discussing
International Law Commission's draft statute to create international criminal court); Bernhard Graefrnth,
Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an International Criminal Court, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 67 (1990)
(discussing United Nations's attempts to establish international criminal court).
121. Indeed, the absence of any judicial stopping point is evident at Nuremberg. Although the
International Military Tribunal began its prosecutions with the major war criminals, nothing in the Charter
limited the principle of individual responsibility to the Nazi regime's top echelon. To the contrary, the
Charter explicitly contemplated that this was just the beginning and that there would be followup national
trials. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
122. A contemporary illustration is the genocide trials in Rwanda. See infra note 132.
123. For an argument for selective prosecutions, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: 171e Duty
to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
124. For example, in a recent report, Helsinki Watch called upon the United Nations to establish a
tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes "starting with those with the highest level of responsibility for
the most egregious crimes." HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEOOVINA 5 (1992). For
discussion of the traditional successor justice paradigm, see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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responsibility; 125 hence this is a paradoxical approach to transitional criminal
responsibility. Insofar as the selective prosecutions approach elevates official
status over traditional understandings of criminal liability, it challenges our
sense that the level of fault should determine criminal responsibility. 126
Nevertheless, our intuitions regarding the nature of criminal liability in
ordinary times may not account well for transitional criminal justice. State
crimes perpetrated in the context of illiberal rule commonly imply a special
case of government wrongdoing, of violation of special duties, such as official
responsibility for subordinates and the state's duty to protect its citizens. 127
Exemplary prosecutions must walk a thin line if they are to express the
intended democratic ideal. 128
Contemporary successor trials have generally attempted to hold the
political leadership accountable for the worst abuses of repressive rule. After
World War II, the actions of the National Socialists and their collaborators
prompted massive attempts at criminal accountability. 129 In the second wave
of political change in Southern Europe, Greek and Portuguese juntas were
brought to trial. 130 In the third wave of political change, there were national
trials in Latin America, East Europe, and Africa. Argentina put its military on
125. As Yamashita shows, a broad s1a1Us-based liability standard holding commandcis accountable for
the acts of their subordinates can backfire. See supra note 110. This issue became v1!al m the American
debate over responsibility for Vietnam-related atrocities al My Lai. Su United St.ates ,. Calley. 46 C J.t.R.
1131 (1973), aff'd, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973), m•'d, Calley v. Callaway, 382 F Supp. 650 (t>t.D. Ga. 1974);
see also CRIMES OF WAR, supra note 110, at 177-415 (collecting documents and essays regarding Vietnamera war crimes); Gary Komarow, Individual Responsibility Under l11umat1onal Law· 771e Nurrmburg
Principles in Domestic Legal Systems, 29 lNT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21. 27-28 (1980) (dtSCUssmg Calley case
in this context). See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIE'JNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY
(1970) (exploring American political official responsibilily for Vietnam-era atrocllles m bgh! of po5!War
precedents).
126. See generally HART, supra note 107, at 114-35 (exploring clements of mens rra g1vmg nsc:: 10
criminal responsibility).
127. For exploration of some of these questions, sec generally Sanford Levinson, Respons1biliry for
Crimes of War, in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 104 (Marshall Cohen ct al. eds .. 1974); Dcnrus F.
Thompson, Criminal Responsibility in Go\•emmenr, in NOMOS XXVll: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 201 (J Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985); and Richard Wasserstrom. 77re Respons1biliry of tire lrulwidual
for War Crimes, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 47 (Virg1rua Held et al. eds.,
1974).
128. For an example in the Greek Tenure Trials, sec O'DONNELL & SCliMITTER. :supra note 10, at
29-30, which discusses Greece's selective prosecutions.
129. Prosecutions of those implicated in World War l1 atrociues sull compnsc:: the largest body of

precedent regarding criminal accountability. These national trials span close to five decades. encompassing
common law, civil, and socialist legal systems. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text. Su
generally RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM, GENOCIDE AND RhlR!BUTION (1983); INGE S NEUMM"N. EUROPEAN
WAR CRIMES TRIALS ( 1951 ); ROCKERL, supra note 41; Sympo51um, Holocaust and Human R1gl1ts Law·
T11e Founlz lntemational Conference, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J I (1992); lus11ce Minister· 5.570 Ca.u:s
of Suspected Nazi Crimes Remain Open. WEEK IN GERMANY, May 3, 1996. at 7 (rcpomng Germany has
prosecuted 106,178 persons since 1945; 6,494 convicted). For a full b1bhograph1c lisung. sec WAll CRL-..tES,
WAR CRIMINALS, AND WAR CRIMES TRIALS (Norman E. Tutorow ed., 1986) (hereinafter WAR CRIMES
BIBLIOGRAPHY).
130. For a discussion of the Greek trials, sec infra note 163 and accompanying text For a dtSCusston
of the Ponuguese transition, see Kenneth Maxwell, Regime O\·enlrro..- and tile Prospects for Drmocra11c
Transition in Ponugal, in TRANsmoNs FROM AUTiiORITARIAN RULE: SOUTiiERN EUROPE 109-37
(Guillermo O'Donnell el al. eds., 1986).

2042

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 2009

trial. 131 There were trials convened as well in Rwanda and South Africa, 132
and recently in Asia. 133 In isolated trials of Communists in East Europe, the
pervasiveness of wrongdoing in totalitarian societies has generally defied
principled attempts to secure criminal retribution. 134
The difficulty of holding the prior political leadership accountable stems
from other recurring questions of justice in periods of massive political
change. 135 In the successor trials following totalitarian rule, the attempt to
apply a priority principle based on political status and to bring the leadership
to justice for the worst crimes has meant successor prosecutions of offenses
perpetrated either at the very beginning of Communist rule or during the
regime's last gasps. Returning to offenses committed in the course of the
Communist takeover means going back half a century. Bringing trials after
such a lengthy passage of time incurs grave jurisdictional problems
necessitating tampering with prevailing law. 136 Such irregularities undermine
the legality of the trials, and risk a message of political justice. 137 Thus
attempts to prosecute past wrongdoing have tended to focus on the violence
131. See David Pion-Berlin, To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin
American Southern Cone, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 105, 105-30 (1994).
132. See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics ofPunislunent, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996); Robyn Green, South African Apartheid Assassin
Jailed for Life, RElITERS, Oct. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
133. See The Mighty Fall in South Korea, ECONOMIST (London), Aug. 31, 1996, at 31, 31 (discussing
treason charges against former Presidents for putting down Kwangju uprising); Tim Shorrock, Ex-Leaders
Go 011 Trial in Seoul, J. COMM., Feb. 27, 1996, at IA.
134. For a journalistic account of the response in the region, see TINA ROSENBERG, THB HAUNTED
LAND (1996). By far, the majority of the trials have been in unified Germany. In Germany, there have been
trials at all levels, relating to the border shootings, as well as other Communist-era wrongdoing. More
recently, in the post-Communist transitions, there have been scattered trials of the top leadership in
Romania and Bulgaria, and trials of high- and mid-level party officials, in the Czech Republic. See infra
note 138. Following political regime changes in the Balkans and in Rwanda, there have been domestic and
international war crimes trials. See supra note 132; infra notes 143, 150, 155.
135. For a discussion of these dilemmas in adjudications of the rule of law in transformative periods,
see supra Sections I.A.-B.
136. In Hungary, for example, a 30-year limitations law blocked trials of those who had used violence
to put down the 1956 uprising. The attempt to lift the Jaw after the fact was deemed unconstitutionally ex
post facto, for all except the most serious crimes. See supra notes 42-45, 65-69, and accompanying text.
For related discussion see supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Poland, the statute of
limitations was lifted in 1991 on crimes committed between 1946 and 1952, to allow the initiation of new
criminal prosecutions. See Patricia Koza, Fornier Security Officers Go 011 Trial for Torturing Prisoners,
UPI, Oct. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Similar tampering with the prior
limitations law occurred in the Czech Republic, and was even sustained by its Constitutional Court. See
Decision on Act No. 19811993 Sb., supra note 41.
For discussion of the rule of law issues raised by such irregularities, see Schulhofcr ct al., supra note
38, at 17.
137. Whether under socialist or continental Jaw, criminal liability is generally circumscribed on the
basis of passage of time. Perhaps the extreme case of the attempt to nevertheless accommodate the criminal
response after totalitarian repression was Germany's prosecution of its former East German Stasi security
police chief, Erich Mielke. The attempt to bring this senior official to justice led all the way back to 1931,
involving 61-year-old offenses relating to murder committed in the last days of the Weimar regime.
Prosecuting Mielke for offenses committed under the predecessor regime hardly related to the abuses
perpetrated under Communist leadership. Mielke's case epitomizes the difficulty of responding to repression
within ordinary understandings of criminal justice. See Erich Mielke Sentenced to Six Years for 1931
Murders, Faces Other Charges, WEEK IN GERMANY, Oct. 29, 1993, at 2.
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attending last-ditch efforts to sustain Communist rule. 138 These attempts at
securing individual accountability seem strangely beside the point. Prosecuting
offenses committed in the predecessor regime's last gasps misses the nature of
totalitarian rule, and thus cannot express a normative response to its distinctive
form of repression.
Contemporary trials hold the leadership accountable on the charge of "bad
rule." Bad rule after the Soviet collapse has generally meant economic
crimes. 139 In the recent transformations from command economies to free
market systems, economic crimes prosecutions delegitimate the predecessor
and legitimate the successor regimes. 1.io To the extent past party practices
could be shown to be corrupt and unlawful, the effon was to put Communism
outside the bounds of legitimate political choice. Just as the trials of the
eighteenth-century transitions from monarchic rule were used to attack the
institution of kingship, so too in the twentieth century, transitional successor
trials are used to delegitimate Communist rule.
This prosecution policy raises rule-of-law problems endemic to successor
justice. Successor trials commonly raise the problem of retroactivity, because
138. In the most notorious of such trials, in Romama, aides to Nicolac Cc::ill5CSCu were com·1ctcd for
their roles in the auempted suppression of the 1989 anti-Commums1 upnsmg. Su Adnan Dascalu, Romania
Jails Eight for 1989 1imisoara Uprising Massacre, REUTERS, Dec. 9, 1991, arn1/ab/e 111 LEXIS, Ne."tis
Library, Reuters File. In the Czech Republic, charges were brought against several h1gh-lcvcl former
Communist leaders for ordering the brutal repression of demonstrations in 1988 and 1989 M1roslav Stepan.
the former head of the Prague Communist Pany, was med first and convicted m 1990. Su Prague s E:r.Party Boss Guilty of Abuse of Power, CHI. TRm., July I0, 1990, § I. at 4. The 1menor m1rus1ers-Fram1SCk
Kincl, Alojz Lorenc, and Karel Vykypcl-wcre convicted m October of 1992 for thctr pans Su Cuclu
Alww Prosecution of Communist Crimes, REUTERS, July 10, 1993, mwlable 111 LEXIS. Ne:os Library,
Reuters File. In Russia, one of the few criminal proceedings iniuated was against the pcrpcuaiors of the
August 1991 putsch. See Howard Witt. Russians \\71itewaslt Blame for 1991 Coup. CHI. T!tm .. Aug. 12,
1994, § I, at I.
139. Economic crimes prosecutions cemer on the theft of "communal propcny" C\'en though such
offenses no longer exist after the fall of Communism. Prosccuuons against the former leadership ha\·e been
initiated for all sorts of economic crimes. Bulgaria's effon has been the most amb1uous, wnh embezzlement
charges brought against the country's former longtime ruler. Su: Ousted Bulgarian Gets 7·Year Tenn for
Embezzlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992, at A2; see also Bulgariar1 Fonner Pnrne M1111ster Sentenced to
Ten Years, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Reuters File In the tnal of another
Communist head of state, Albania's former President Ramiz Aha was prosecuted for abuse of power and
embezzlement for misappropriating public funds. See last Corrummist P~s1dem Jailed for N111e Years.
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 2, 1994, amilable in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File In Germany. the
head of East Germany's labor federation was convicted of "fraud against soc1alm propcny" Su Marc
Fisher, Former East Gennan Labor Boss Com·icted of Fraud. Released, WASH. POST, June 7, 1991. Jt Al 8
In the Czech Republic, former Communist leaders were subject to criminal invesugauons for ta.'t evasion
See Czech Republic: Slomkia Asked about CorrunumstJ · Tax E:r.emp11011, REUTERS. Jan. 30, 1995, avmlable
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
140. Perhaps the best example is the Moscow tnal of its Communist Pany, ansmg after an auempt
to ban the Party. See On Suspending the Acti\•ity of the RSFSR Communist Pany. Vcdomostl Fed. Sobr
RF., 1991, No. 35, item 1149, tanslared in CURRENT DIG. S0\'11:."T PRESS, Oct 2. 1991. at II, Official
Kremlin /ntemational Nell's Broadcast, July 6, 1992, mailable 111 LEXIS, News Library. Sounws File.
David Remnick, Tlte Trial of rite Old Regime, NI:."'\\' YORKER, Nov 30. 1992. al IQ.I Although there: arc
precedents for criminalizing organizations such as at Nuremberg, there the: organuatmnal conv11:uons were
to seive as predicates for subsequent charges of individuals Su TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATO~IY OF THI:.
NUREMBERG TRIALS 35-36 ( 1992). In its unconvenuonal use of the cnmmal process to try a pohucal pany.
the Moscow trial tests the boundaries of the criminal law for lr.inslllonal normatl\'C pu~
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normative change frequently implies prosecutions of new offenses enacted after
the fact. When prosecutions fail to guarantee prospectivity, as when they imply
predecessor offenses that have lost force, they challenge ordinary
understandings of the rule of law. When the elements of political authority and
the gravity of offense become disconnected, 141 the purpose laid bare is the
political one of eliminating the opposition. This policy risks being perceived
as political justice, threatening the normative purposes of prosecution.
An alternative line of successor trials focuses criminal accountability not
on those most politically responsible, but instead upon perpetrators of the worst
offenses. This offense-based approach leads all the way down to the lowest
rung of the totalitarian state, to the police and guards who personally
committed brutalities. Greece's 1975 "torturers' trials" represent an illustration
of offense-based trials. 142 A more contemporary example is the Balkans
trials. 143 As with the trials of the political leadership, offense-driven trials do
not fit easily within the criminal justice framework applicable to ordinary
times. Although the trials comprehend the most serious offenses of prior rule,
the gravamen of these prosecutions, torture or war crimes, are not generally
considered offenses under prevailing law. When offense-based successor trials
imply tampering with prevailing procedure, these irregularities can undermine
the rule of law. Moreover, insofar as such trials seem to exonerate leaders,
they appear to scapegoat those brought to justice. Such prosecutions raise the
perception of politicization, and challenge criminal justice's ability to construct
the transition.
C. The Crime Against Humanity and Contemporary Tyranny

The normative potential of transitional criminal justice is most clear in the
response to the most extreme form of persecution. Prosecution of the crime
against humanity exemplifies a transitional measure of a critical transformative
form. 144 By definition, the crime against humanity is the core offense of
modern repressive rule, the paradigmatic offense against mankind. The crime
against humanity comprises grave offenses, such as murder, deportation, and
torture-long considered crimes when committed in wartime against
civilians-as well as persecution based on political, racial, and religious
grounds. 145 Crimes against humanity are offenses that transcend national

141. An example would be the post-Communist economic crimes trials, where the prior leadership is
being held accountable, but not for the most grave crimes of prior rule.
142. See supra note 128.
143. See The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Indictments Against Mcakic
and Others and Tactic and Others, 34 I.L.M. 1011, 1028-44 (1995).
144. For other illustrations, see supra notes 33-37, 51-55, 104-08, and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying notes 159, 172, 198.
145. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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boundaries and are considered to violate the laws of all nations. 1.:6
This jurisprudence evinces the clear delimiting of state power on the basis
of individual rights nonns. As the crime against humanity is often prosecuted
outside the affected territory, in the absence of regime change, it is perhaps the
purest illustration of the potential of law to effect nonnative transition and to
offer a way to mediate the dilemma of successor justice. The concept is
exemplified whenever states respond to atrocities in ways that transcend
national borders. Indeed, the very response to the crime against humanity
instantiates its core value of transcendent justice. 147
The crime against humanity is an extraordinary criminal offense in several
respects. It is exempt from traditional jurisdictional principles limiting the
prosecution of ordinary crimes, such as territoriality and the passage of
tirne. 148 If, under the traditional jurisdictional principle of territoriality, where
146. At Nuremberg, prosecution was limited to those crimes against humam1y also m some way
related to the war. Though formally an independent charge, the crime againsl humanity was assumlatcd mlo
other war crimes offenses, including violating the boundaries of permissible war. For an il!:coun1. see
TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 8-20. See also EUOENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAU OF THE GER.\IA.'iS 1-38
(1966).
147. Through its international prosecutions, Nuremberg epnom1zcd the central concept of th.: cnme
against humanity, but the concept precedes its codification at Nuremberg. Such intemauonal remonstrarn:es
occurred, for example, in response to Greco-Turkish warfare in 1827. Su general/)· WAR CRL\tES
BIBL!OORAPHY, supra note 129, al 114-19; Egon Schwclb, Crimes Agauur Huma1111y, 23 BRIT Y.B 11--r"L
L. 178 (tracing development of concept of crimes against humanity since Hague Con\'enuon of 1907)
Similarly, in the early 1900s, there were international remons1rances "in the name of humanny"' agall15t
persecution in Romania and Russia. Regarding the World War I period, there were international =ponsc:s
to Turkish war crimes. See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOOUE TO NUREMBERG: THE Pouncs AND DIPLOMACY
OF PUNISHINO w AR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD wAR 157 ( 1982) (referring to 1919 charactcnzalton
of Armenian massacres as offending '"what mighl be called the law of humanity or the moral law'")
(quoting 1919 remark of Greek Foreign Minister Nicolas Politis)). Following World War I, a commission
convened regarding the methods used in the waging of the war and declared that these pracuces violated
the "established laws and cus1oms of war and the elementary laws of humanny" and were accordingly
liable to criminal prosecution. See U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, H!STORY OF THE UNITED NATIO:-:s WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 36 (1948); Commmton on Ifie
Responsibility of die Aurhors of rhe \\nr and on £11forcernen1 of Penalries. Mar. 29, 1919, repnnud m 14
AM. J. lNT'L L. 95 (1920). The 1917 offenses were similar to those later dcscnbcd after World War II
instruments: murder, tonure, and racial persecution of minonues by their own gm·emments At the ume
of the drafting of the London Charter and Control Council Law No. IO. the U N War Comes Commission
defined "crimes against humanily" as "systematic mass acuon".
Only crimes which either by their magni1ude and savagery or by their large number or by the
fact that a similar pauem is applied at different umes and places. endangered the 1ntem.iuonal
community or shocked the conscience of mankind, warr.mlcd mlerYention by states other than
that on whose territory the crimes have been commincd, or whose subjects ha\'e become th.:1r
victims.
See U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, supra, at 179.
148. See Inremational Law Commission, supra note 114, Pnnc1pk II The fact that mtcmal l.iw doe;
not impose a penalty for an act thal constitules a cnme under mtcrnauonal law docs not rehe\'e the person
who commiued the act from responsibili1y under international law. Su U.N GAOR, 5th Scss, Supp No
12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinred in W. MICHAEL RclSMAN & CHRIST MIANIOU, THE LAws OF
WAR 335 (1994). See generally Geneva Convention Rela1i\·e to the Protecuon of C1\'1han Persons m Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Addiuonal to the Gcnc\'a Convcnuons
of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Anncd Conlhcts (Protocol
I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; United Nauons Convcnuon on Prohibiuons or Rcstnct1ons on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excess1\·cly lnjunous or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oc1. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONFJ95/15, reprimed m 19 I LM 1523 0980) For
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the crime occurs is considered the place of the wronged community, every
state could consider itself wronged by a crime against humanity, and thus
every state is free to bring perpetrators to trial. 149 The central idea of the
crime as an offense against all humanity is inextricably connected to the
jurisdictional principle of universality and prosecutability by all nations. 150
Similarly, such prosecutions are unconstrained by the ordinary parameters of
time. While ordinarily criminal offenses must be written into domestic penal
law to avoid violating basic principles against retroactivity, 151 the crime
against humanity is considered an offense "among civilized nations," and it is
therefore punishable with or without legislation. 152 Thus, between the Nazi
and Communist reigns of terror and their successor prosecutions, there are gaps
of close to half a century, 153 colliding with our ordinary intuitions about
criminal justice delayed. 154 In the crime against humanity, distinguished by
absence of ordinary jurisdictional limits, the potential of the criminal law
transcends political boundaries and the need for regime change.
Over the years, the understanding of the crime against humanity has forged
the definition of modem persecution. At first, the crime was conceptualized on
an objective basis, as an offense defined in terms of classes of victims. Thus,
a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary status of related humanitarian law, see THEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 10-25 (1989), which argues for
convergence in the normative definition of rights violations.
149. Similar justifications provide the basis for the seemingly anomalous prosecutions in Canada,
England, Scotland, and Australia following World War II. See Symposium, Prosecuting World War /I
Persecutors: Efforts at an Era's End, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 199, 199 (1992).
150. Thus, in the Eichmann case, the jurisdictional principle of universality is considered inextricably
bound up with the nature of the crime against humanity. Adolf Eichmann's abduction from Argentina and
his prosecution in Israel for crimes committed in Europe during the war epitomizes the principle of
universality relating to jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. Because of the distinctive nature of the
crime against humanity, Eichmann's trial was considered to violate neither retroactivity nor territoriality
principles. See Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jm. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S.
Ct. Isr. 1962).
Contemporary crimes against humanity trials also rely upon similar understanding of universality. See
Prosecutor v. Tactic, Case No. IT-94-l-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber, Int'! Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Oct. 2, 1995), repri11ted i11 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
151. There is an understanding ratified in most legal systems by laws establishing time limits, even
for the most serious crimes. Regarding the crime against humanity and imprcscriptibility, sec Pierre
Mertens, L'lmprescriptibilite des crimes de guerre et des crimes comre l'huma11ite, 51 REVUE DB DROIT
P~AL ET DE CRIMINOLOOIE 204 (1970).
152. This special exemption of crimes against humanity from the ban on retroactive legislation,
recognized at Nuremberg, has now become ratified as part of the European Convention on Human Rights:
"This ... shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the
time it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civillscd
nations." European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230.
153. See Federation Natio11ale des Deportes et Imemes Resistants et Patriotes v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R.
125 (Fr., Cass. crim., Dec. 20, 1985).
154. More than a half-century after the events, World War II-related trials are taking place not only
throughout Europe, but also in Canada and Australia. On the question of the passage of time and legal
responses, see, for example, DAVID CESARANI, JUSTICE DELAYED (1992), which describes the British
campaign to find Nazi war criminals; DAVID MATAS, JUSTICE DELAYED: NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN
CANADA (1987); and Symposium, supra note 149, passim. On the delay in the United States, see ALLAN
A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA (1984).
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at Nuremberg, the crime against humanity was defined by the protected status
of civilians during wartime. Over time, the crime against humanity extended
beyond attacks by states against foreign enemies to the abuses perpetrated
against even their own civilians during peacetime. The contemporary
conceptualization of the crime against humanity is toward a subjective, highly
nonnative understanding, protecting against racial, ethnic, political, or religious
persecution. 155 The significance of the offense has become generalized, with
the potential for comprehending persecution on a seemingly universal
basis. 156
The crime against humanity criminalizes the ultimate political offense:
political persecution, the offense of enemy creation. Although the crime against
humanity is not explicitly predicated on stale involvement, persecution
constitutes a crime of ideology of such magnitude that even where not overtly
state-promoted, it is considered as having been committed against a backdrop
of government policy. 157 The crime against humanity mediates individual and
collective responsibility in the transition. Stace implication in political
persecution epitomizes the contemporary conception of tyranny. Equality
violations are nowhere more pronounced than where the state is the perpetrator
and citizens are persecuted on a racial, ethnic, political, or religious basis.

155. In the 1987 prosecution of Klaus Barbie, the Nazi chief in occupied Lyon, for ordcnng
deportations to death camps, the critical issue was whether anned members of the resistance could
nevenheless be protected under the rubric of the "crime against humanity.'' For purposes of the cnmc
against humanity, the French High Court held that the rele\•ant question was not the \'icums' status, 1.c ..
whether they were civilians or resistance, but whether the accused had acted with the requ1Site intent. What
distinguished the crime against humanity was the purpose of per.;ccution. Su Barbie. 78 I.L R. at 139-40
The jurisprudence of the first international war crimes tribunals since the postwar pcnod. concerrung
violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, goes well beyond Nuremberg The various acts
constituting crimes against humanity are: murder, exterminauon, enslavement, dcponauon, impnsonmcnt,
torture, rape, persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts Su Tnbunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 119, at 1173. The understanding of the CommtsSion of Expens was
that the International Tribunal had jurisdiction o\•er crimes against humanny. whether the conflict was
"international" or "internal." As a mauer of internauonal customary law. the CommtsSion of Expens
considered that, no matter the nature of the conflict, universal JUnsdicuon existed for cnmes against
humanity and genocide. See Final Repon of rhe Commission of Expens Esrab/1slied Purmanr 10 Secunn·
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, at 13 (1992); see also Tad1c, 35 1 L ~I at 4lS-73 Funher.
the Tribunal's jurisdiction extends to crimes not commmcd by agents of the state. so long as commllled
"under color" of the stale. Article 2 on the competence of the lnternauonal Tnbunal prondcs "'The
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons commmmg or ordcnng to be commmcd
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,'' and then goes on to hst specific offenses
See Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 119, at 1171
156. For an example of such legislation, consider the French cnmcs against humanity law which
incorporated the Nuremberg Charter, showing the sense m which the offense of cnmes against humanny
has become universalii.ed. C. PEN. Art. 213-5 (Fr.).
157. In the Barbie opinion, France's High Coun defined persccuuon as commmcd in a systcmauc
manner in the name of a "[s)tate practising a policy of ideological supremacy" Barbi(, 78 1 LR. at 128
This feature of the offense has jurisdictional consequences. As a practical matter. imphcauon of the
Stale in the crime against humanity affects even the possibility of mvesugauon. because of the hkehhood
of state coverup and other obstruction of justice, and, as such, jusufies lifung the ordinary space am! umc
barriers to prosecution. This could be understood as analogous in the ordinary cnminal law to the
justification for lifting of time limits to offenses like embezzlement and conspiracy. when these cnmes
implicate public officials.
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When criminal justice denounces these crimes, such prosecutions have a
systemic impact transcending the implicated individual. 158 To society, such
trials express the normative value of equality under the law, a threshold value
in the transformation to liberal democratic systems.
The normative implications of the legal response to tyranny transcend
periods of political change. The transitional element of the crime against
humanity becomes generalized. Even after the passage of time, these criminal
sanctions can be used to reinvent the differences between liberal and illiberal
regimes. For the late twentieth century, persecution for reasons of politics,
race, ethnicity, and religion is incontrovertibly the paradigm of contemporary
tyranny. 159 In the crime against humanity jurisprudence, the strongest
sanction in law is invoked to condemn past state evil. Where past systems of
persecution were perpetrated under law, prosecution of persecution is an
undoing that sends a message about a new legality.

D. The Transitional Criminal Sanction
The paradigm shift in notions of justice and fairness relating to application
of criminal justice in periods of political change raises numerous recurring
dilemmas discussed above. In the ordinary understanding of criminal justice,
identifying and establishing wrongdoing and penalties are generally conceived
158. Debates over whether to prosecute throw into relief the distinctive gravity of the crime against
humanity. Lifting time limitations has been justified as an exception for "atrocious" crimes. See, e.g.,

Question of Punislunent of War Criminals and ofPersons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity:
Question oft/le Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,
U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 22d Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 84, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/906 (1996). In the debates over whether to extend the statutes of limitations for World War
II-related murder, extensions were justified under a retributive rationale on the basis of the crime's
heinousness. On the international level, the dilemma was resolved by the enactment of the United Nations
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.
See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. After a heated debate in 1965, when, according to prevailing
penal law, 20-year limits on war-related charges would have set in, the West German Parliament attempted
to put a stop to the trials; ultimately, the resolution was to limit most of the World War II-related offenses,
but to lift the time limits applicable to offenses comprising crimes against humanity (defined as "base
motive" murder). See Robert Monson, The West German Statute of Limitations on Murder: A Political,
Legal and Historical Exposition, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 610-11 (1982). For an account of Germany's
arguments for lifting the statute of limitations on World War II-related murder, see Martin Clausnitzer, Tlte
Statute of Limitations for Murder in tlte Federal Republic of Gennany, 29 lNT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 478
(1980). Amnesties were rejected on the grounds they would offend the dignity of tyranny's victims.
Justifications for criminal accountability on the basis of the victims' dignity also appear in the more recent
transitions. For discussion of the punishment/impunity debate, see Jaime Malamud-Goti, Punislunellt and
a Rights-Based Democracy, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1991, at 3. Regarding the role of victims
in the pursuit of punishment as a general matter, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: The Role of tlte
Victim, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 209 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990).
159. Thus, in American constitutional jurisprudence, for example, state-sponsored racial, ethnic, and
religious discrimination is considered to be a grave abrogation of equality, and is accorded the highest
constitutional protection. Racially motivated crimes can revive past state-sponsored racial persecution even
where privately sponsored, and can have profound significance. The persistence and understanding of the
nature and role of successor criminal justice may well help to explain the special significance of
contemporary domestic trials involving racial crimes.
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as a unitary practice, but in the criminal sanction's transitional fonn these
elements become detached from one another. The partial criminal process,
emphasizing prosecution over punishment, distinguishes the transitional
criminal sanction.
The transitional criminal sanction prosecutes past regime wrongs but does
not necessarily culminate in individual culpability and punishment. The
emergence of this transitional criminal sanction in periods of political change
is illustrated throughout history, for example in the post-World War I
trials, 160 the World War II cases, 161 the postmilitary trials of Southern
Europe, as well as contemporary successor criminal justice in Latin
America162 and Africa. In the wave of political change in Central Europe that
followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, a similar sequence unfolded. 163
Throughout the region, there has been a general movement toward the
limitation of criminal proceedings and punishment. 1().1 As in the postwar
period, successor justice after totalitarian rule has revealed a de facto limiting
of the criminal sanction.
The emergence of the transitional criminal sanction in periods of political
flux presents an alternative to the complete waiver of punishment. 165 In
160. See SHELDON GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMEST 19-36 (1944)
(providing account of history of action taken against German war criminals un<L:r Treaty of VcrsaJIJcs),
see also WILLIS, supra note 147, at 116-39, 174-76 {exploring post-World War I efforts to punish war
criminals as precedents for Nuremberg).
161. Many convicted in the Control Council Law No. 10 trials by occupauon authonues were lightly
punished under a clemency program supervised by U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy. See FRANK M.
BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946-1955, at 62-6-l (1989).
162. Shonly after the 1980s Argentine junta trials there were limits on the follow-up tnals and
pardons. Ultimately, presidential pardons would extend to e\·eryone com·icted of atrocmes. e\·en htghranking junta leaders. See AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH ANO PARTIAL JUSTICE IN AROENTINA. AN UPDATE
45-52, 65-70 (1991); Pion-Berlin, supra note 131.
163. Greece's trials of its military police culminated in suspended or commu1able scrueoccs Su
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN GREECE: THE FIRST TORTURERS' TRIAL 1975, al 65 (1977); P
Nikiforos Diamandouros, Regime Change and rlze Prospects for Democracy 111 Grucc· 1974-1983, 111
TRANSmONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE, supra note I, at 138.
164. In Germany's border guards trials, suspension of sentences has been the norm. Of the 11 guards
tried as of November 1992, only one has ac1ually sen·ed time m jail. See UPI, NO\'. 3, 1992, cn·ailablc 111
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. Many prosecutions in the Czech Republic culm1na1ed m suspended or
conditional sentences; only a handful of top Communists, such as Prague party cluef Miroslav Stepan.
served prison terms, lasting no more than two years. See 28 Communw Ofjic1als Tncd for
Anriconsrirurional Activity, CTK NAT'L NEWS WIRE, Sepl. 21, 1994, amilable 111 LEXIS, News Library.
CTK File; David Stamp, East Europe s Communist Elire E\•ades Prosecutors, REUTERS WORLD SERV , Feb.
14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Re\•wld File. In Romania, all of the former Commurust
leaders and police jailed in connection with the December 1989 massacres were released over a two-year
period, either on health grounds or as a result of presidential pmlons. Su Romanians Proust O\'er
Communist Bosses' Release, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Sept. 21, 1994, cn·ailable 111 LEXIS, News Library,
Revwld File. In Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov failed to sen·e time for embezzlement. wlule others m the n:g1me
have been pardoned. Similarly, in Albania. an amnesty law immumz.es prior regime lca<L:rs senteoced for
abuse of power, even the country's last Communisl Presiden1. Su Fonner Albanian P1u1dcnr Has Sentence
Cur By T1iree Years, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 30, 1994, cn·ailab/e 111 LEXIS, News Library, AFP
File; see also Holmes, supra note 2.
165. Despite amnesties, criminal investigations would provide a record n:Jaung 10 pnor m1htary rule
Unlike other instances of the limited sanction discussed abo\•e, penalties would be dropped in advance, and
on condition of confession to wrongdoing. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH-AMERICAS, UNSETTLED BUSINESS.
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postapartheid South Africa, for example, the declaration of amnesty for
political crimes left a window for investigation and documentation of past
wrongdoing. 166 Contemporary international legal responses suggest a similar
development in the tribunals convened to try atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. An emphasis on prosecution rather than punishment
reflects the extraordinary nature of transitional justice. 167
How does partial punishment lead to the common perception that justice
was done? Consider the transitional criminal sanction. Ordinarily, the criminal
sanction is justified by identifying and punishing individual offenders, while
the limited criminal sanction is largely justified by distinctly transitional
purposes. These transition-related purposes are both backward- and forwardlooking in nature. In successor trials in periods of political change, the criminal
process condemns past wrongdoing. Formal criminal processes enable
factfinding about past wrongdoing at a high standard of certainty. 168 In
periods of substantial political change, the heuristic purposes of the criminal
investigation 169 relate to the prosecution of offenses with a public dimension.
Such trials clarify the criminal actions perpetrated under the prior regime. This
knowledge about the past is often constructed for the first time in the context
of the criminal trial. Identification and documentation of predecessor crimes,
even where not fully individuated, enable the denunciation of the prior
regime, 170 as the society has to understand what happened before it can
condemn and delegitimate. 171 Furthermore, establishing knowledge of past
HUMAN RIGIITS IN CHILE AT THE START OF THE FREI PRESIDENCY 1-4 (1994).
166. See Azanian Peoples Organization v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR
1015 (CC) (upholding constitutionality of amnesty act); Lourens du Plessis, Amnesty and Tra11sitio11 111
South Africa, in DEALING WITH THE p AST: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 107 (Alex
Boraine, Janet Levy & Ronel Scheffer eds., 1994).
167. The pursuit of justice during wartime and in a fragile peace has consequences for the effective
application of the criminal law, with implications for the possibility of adversarial trial and punishment.
With the general absence of custody over the accused, problems gaining control over evidence, and
constraints relating to the particular nature of these war crimes, it is expected that in virtually all cases, the
International Tribunal will investigate and indict-and go no further. Indeed, the international criminal
proceedings include a newly created hybrid procedure between indictment and conviction, exemplifying
the limited sanction. The Tribunal rules provide for a special public indictment proceeding whereby, despite
the absence of the accused, all of the underlying evidence is marshalled and publicly read and the
indictment confirmed. See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 61, Feb. II, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 484, 519 (1994).
168. The standard is "beyond a reasonable doubt." See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III,
Defenses, Presumptions, a11d Burdell of Proof i11 the Crimillal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1327 (1979).
169. The heuristic purposes of the criminal trial lead back to an early sixteenth-century meaning of
"prosecution," signifying to know precisely, to investigate, ot to delve in detail into a matter. See 12 THB
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 662 (2d ed. 1989).
170. See generally HART, supra note I 07, at 170-73 (discussing "denunciatory" theory of punishment);
PUNISHMENT: SELECTED READINGS (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1975) (noting that punishment
may be understood to express and ratify hatred that is excited by offenses).
171. On the social construction processes, see generally BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 17, at
85-86, 107-09; PAUL CONNERTON, HOW SOCIETIES REMEMBER (1989); R.S. PERINBANAYAOAM,
SIGNIFYING ACTS (1985); and SHELDON STRYKER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: A SOCIAL STRUCTURAL
VISION (1980).
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actions committed under color of Jaw and its public construction as
wrongdoing is the necessary threshold to prospective normative uses of the
criminal law.
The emergence of the limited sanction, therefore, signals a practical
resolution of the central dilemma of transitional criminal justice: how to
attribute individual responsibility for grave wrongdoing perpetrated under
repressive rule. Without fully assigning individual guilt, the transitional
criminal sanction nevertheless enables societies to recognize and condemn past
wrongdoing perpetrated under repressive rule. 172 A line is drawn between
regimes, thereby allowing the political transformation to justify the transition.
In the next Part, I turn to the constitutional responses in periods of change.
Just as the transitional criminal response expresses a normative shift against
past political power abuses, transitional constitutionalism also embodies a
normative shift that delimits and transcends the political past.

Ill.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE

I now turn to the nature and role of constitutionalism in periods of political
change. The central dilemma is how to reconcile the concept of
constitutionalism with revolution: 173 Revolutionary periods and their
aftermath are times of political flux, and, as such, present tensions with
constitutionalism, which is ordinarily considered to bind the political order. l
begin by exploring the prevailing conception of the relation of constitutional
to political change, and in particular, the modern claim for constitutionalism
as foundational to democracy. Rather than arguing against the prevailing
model, I contend that this model best describes an eighteenth-century view of
the relation of the constitutional to the political. Hence it cannot capture the
constitutional developments associated with political change during the last
half-century, and needs to be supplemented. 174 I will explore manifestations
of constitutionalism in periods of substantial political change, and suggest that
these give rise to another paradigm of transitional constitutionalism. which

172. It is my contention that the panial criminal sanction associated wnh pcn!Xls of pohtu:al
transformation as a practical matter resolves the central successor JUSllCC debate over purushmem or
impunity. Neither full punishment nor full impunity charactenzcs the tranSlllonal sancuon On the
punishment/impunity debate, see generally the essays collected in STATE CRL\IES: PUNtsHMENT OR PAROON.
supra note 1. See also Carlos S. Nino, 17ze Dury ro Punish Pasr Abrues of Human Rzglrrs Pur mro Conrar:
17ze Case of Argenrina, 100 YALE LJ. 2619 (1991); Jose Zalaquctt. Balancmg Erl11ca/ lmpcracwes and
Polirical Consrraints, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1425 (1992).
173. See supra note 9.
174. On the contemporary explosion in constnutionmakmg, see Juho Faundcz. Corur111111ona/1sm. A
Tunely Revival, in CONSTITIJTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSmONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
354, 356 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter CONSTITlJT!ONAUSM ANO DEMOCRACY) Su
generally ]ON ELSTER & RUNE SUOSTAD, CONSTITUT!ONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1988) (collcctmg
essays that discuss relation of constitutionalism to democr.icy)
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provides an alternative account of constitutionalism in its third century. 175
Constitutionalism in periods of political change stands in constructivist
relation to the prevailing political order. Transitional constitutionalism not only
is constituted by the prevailing political order, but is also constitutive of the
perception of political change. 176 These constitutions arise in a variety of
different processes, and play multiple roles, serving conventional constitutions'
aspirational purposes as well as other purposes in a transformative politics.
Transitional constitutionmaking responds to past repressive rule, through
principles delimiting and redefining the prevailing political system. They, in
tum, effect further political change in the system. Such constitutions are
simultaneously backward- and forward-looking, yet informed by a conception
of constitutional justice that is distinctively transitional.
A. The Prevailing Models

To the extent that there has been theorizing about the nature and role of
constitutionalism in periods of political change, it is commonly guided by
competing realist or idealist perspectives. In the realist view, constitutions in
periods of political change are thought simply to reflect the prevailing balance
of political power, and are therefore epiphenomenal with, and arise by virtue
of, the provenance of the political change. 177 Under this view, it is not at all
clear what distinguishes the making of a constitution from other lawmaking;
what, if any, is the distinctive value of constitutions in the transition. As such,
this approach offers little to the project of discerning the significance of the
nature and role of constitutionalism in such periods. It follows that idealists
have provided the dominant approach to exploration of constitutionalism in
periods of political change.

175. In this Anicle, I propose an alternative paradigm, though I have not fully addressed all of the
questions the proposed alternative paradigm raises for our understanding of constitutionallsm, judicial
review, or interpretive principles.
176. I refer here to the constructivist role of the constitutional document. See supra note 17. The use
of the term constructivism in the analysis pursued here, see infra note 221, regarding constitutional change
bears a certain similarity to the processes characterized by Rawls in his elaboration of gradual construction
of political consensus. See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 90--99 (defining "political constructivism"). Rawls uses
the term "political constructivism" to describe the gradual emergence of constitutional consensus as a result
of a step-by-step dccisionmaking process which narrows the area of parties' political differences. My
analysis is constructivist in a somewhat different sense. While I agree with Rawls that new constitutional
elements gradually emerge over time through the political process, I also claim that each change ln the
constitutional order changes the perspective of the participants, in tum changing their sense of what ls
politically possible and hence, the potential for constitutional consensus.
177. For the realist relation in political theory, see AREND LUPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTBRNS OP
MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TwENTY-ONE COUNTRIES (1984). For a contemporary
account, see Courtney Jung & Ian Shapiro, South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition,
and the New Constitutional Order, 23 POL. & Soc'y 269 (1995). For a realist account of the American
Constitution, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OP THE CONSTITUTION OP THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
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In idealist constitutional theorizing, there is a nonnative claim for a strong
connection between revolution and constitutionmaking. This strong connection
first appears in the classical constitutional model in Aristotle's writings. 178
Its modern expression appears in Hannah Arendt's work; 179 and a
contemporary articulation can be found in the work of Bruce Ackennan. 180
Although these are different in important respects, there are affinities among
these claims for the potential of constitutionmaking in effectuating political
change. Below, these are considered as a triad in the intellectual history of
constitutional politics.
Constitutionalism in periods of political transfonnation raises a basic
tension between radical political change and the constraints on such change
that would appear to be the predicate of constitutional order. In the idealist
model discussed more fully below, the dilemma is reconciled by positing that
constitutionalism functions as the very basis of the new democratic political
order: a claim for constitutional foundationalism.

1.

The Classical View

In the classical view, the constitution is understood as the state's
fundamental political arrangements, the distinctive fonn or organization
determining its structure and function. 181 On this understanding, the
constitution is at once normative and descriptive. 182 Accordingly, in the
classical view, revolutionary political change means constitutional change.
Radical political transformation does not necessarily require a change in
political leadership, representation, or membership, for it is the constitution that
determines the identity of the polis. 183
The classical account of constitutional politics is organic constitutionalism.
In the classical view, the unity of the acts of revolution and constitution sheds
light on the dilemma posed by the relation of constitutionalism to political
change. Issues of justice remain, despite the move to a more democratic order.

178. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying tell!. Although the classu;al undemanding of
constitutionalism generally is not considered to follow an 1dcal1St model, in its view of the rclauon of
constitutions to political change, it shares affiniucs with the model d1Scusscd herein
179. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying tell!.
180. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying lellt.
181. In the Aristotelian view, constitutions arc organic enuucs. 'The 'cor1Smuuon' of a state IS the
organization of the offices ...." ARISTOTLE, THE PoLmcs 187 (T.A. Sinchur trans., 1957). sec also
CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (1940) (dcscnbing ancient
conception of constitution); Peter G. Stillman, Hegel's Idea of Consrirunonalism, m CoSSTITUTIOSAlJSM
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 88 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988) (discussing Anstotellan bad:grourul
of Hegel's constitutionalism).
182. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 181, at 198 ("[T)he assoc1auon which IS a state C.'tlSts not for the
purpose of living together but for the sake of noble acuons ")
183. When the constitution changes, so docs the pohs ··For the stale IS a kmd of assoc1auon-an
association of citizens in a cor1Stitution; so when the cor1Sutuuon changes and becomes different m kmd.
the state also would seem necessarily not to be the same" ARISTOTLE, supra note 181. at 176

2054

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 2009

Yet this account leads to the following questions: What is the relationship
between reconstitution and political change? How does the new constitutional
consciousness that defines the transition occur? The classical paradigm invites,
but does not elaborate, a theory of the role of constitutionalism in the process
of political change.

2. The Modern Claim
As distinguished from the classical view, modern constitutional theory
emphasizes normative limits on state power of a structural and individual rights
nature. 184 The paradoxical role of modern constitutions is that they are
considered to provide such limits on government despite periods of political
change. How is one to reconcile the modern view of constitutionalism with
constitutional change?
This is the dilemma of constitutionalism in the context of massive political
change. For Hannah Arendt, the dilemma is resolved through a rethinking of
the theory of constitutionalism. Rather than conceptualizing constitutionmaking
as counterrevolutionary, and the opposite of political change, the "truly
revolutionary element in constitution-making" is "the act of foundation." 185
The Arendtian vision of revolutionary constitutionmaking draws heavily from
American constitutionmaking. In this version, the apparent dilemma of the
incompatibility of revolution and constitution disappears; the two political acts
merge. The constitution is deemed the culmination of revolution; it is the
"deliberate attempt by a whole people at founding a new body politic." 186
The Arendtian account resolves the tension between revolution and
constitutionalism through the mediating idea of foundation. 187 The notion of
a Founding elegantly reconciles the dilemma of political change with
constitutional permanence. Though paradoxical, the very nature of the
revolutionary change sought is the constitutive act of founding. American
constitutionalism is distinguished by the paradox of constitutional change: It
is revolutionary but lasting. The American posture toward its revolution
ushered in a paradigm of constitutionalism as foundational to its democratic
order. In this paradigm, constitutionalism was something other than its classical
184. Nevertheless, as we shall see, aspects of the classical conceptualization remain pertinent to the
modem model, at least with regard to the reigning vision of the nature and role of constitutions in periods
of political change. The classical view equates constitutions with political arrangements, with impllcatlons
for the preeminent nature and role of constitutionalism in periods of political change.
185. ARENDT, supra note 9, at 142. For a good historical account of the development of
constitutionalism between the English Civil War and the start of the twentieth century, sec M.J.C. VILB,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967).
186. ARENDT, supra note 9, at 143.
187. America's revolutionaries are described as "Founding Fathers," preoccupied with "permanence."
In constitutionmaking, their purpose is ''the deeply felt desire for an Eternal City on earth," and the wish
to create a government which "would be capable of arresting the cycle of sempiternal change, the rise and
fall of empires, and establish an immortal city." Id. at 232-34.
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sense, identified with the political order. It was also more than
constitutionalism in the Magna Carta sense, as protective of negative liberties.
The idea of constitutional democracy transcended protection of individual
rights. An idealized constitutional model, foundational constitutionalism had
the potential to embody the full nonnative sweep of the revolution. iss
Building upon the Arendtian account, American constitutionalist Bruce
Ackennan also makes a strong nonnative claim for constitutionmaking as
foundational to democratic revolution. 189 On this view, constitutionmaking
is the necessary and final stage of liberal revolutions, a revolutionary
"constitutional moment" of rupture from the m1cie11 regime and the founding
of a new political order. In the more contemporary constitutional theorizing,
transformative constitutionmaking is not limited to the revolution; instead,
there are potentially many more such constitutive moments. By extending the
possibility of transfonnative constitutionmaking beyond the revolution,
Ackennan contributes to the modern model a helpful categorical distinction
between ordinary and constitutional politics. Within the "dualist democracy"
framework, ordinary political change and constitutional change proceed on
separate tracks, 190 offering a neat resolution of the dilemma posed by
constitutionalism in revolutionary periods. By a move defining "dual"
categories of "ordinary" decisionmaking by government as opposed to "higher"
lawmaking by "the People," the dilemma with which this Part begins, of
constitutionalism and radical political change, seemingly falls away. 191 In a
dualist democracy, the dilemmas of constitutional beginnings, constitutional
change, and constitutional review are made to disappear.
In the contemporary model, constitutionmaking relates to revolution
through higher lawmaking, yet the distinction between higher and lower
lawmaking remains ambiguous. What distinguishes higher lawmaking is a
distinctive process, a particular timing, 192 and heightened, deliberative
decisionmaking. 193 Foundationalists embrace the view that the special status
of constitutional politics derives from its popular sovereignty, expressed
188. See id. at 157 (observing that "[c)onsutution-making" was cons1den:d by Framers as -the
foremost and the noblest of all revolutionary deeds").
189. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 61 ("If the aim IS to transform the very character of
constitutional norms, a clean break seems desirable ...."). For Ackerman. a -1cgmmate order" depends
on "a systematic effon to state the principles of the new regime.'' Id. at 57 (crnphaslS ommcd) Su
generally CONSTITUTJONALISM, lDENnTY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEOITIMAC\' (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994)
(analyzing relationship between constitutionalism and group identity).
190. See Bruce Ackerman, Consriruriona/ Polirics!Consrirurional Law, 99 YALE L.J -l53 . .$61-62
(1989).
191. See id.
192. Ackerman describes a constitutional onset period, a window of time for consutuuonmakmg or
"constitutional moments." Constitutionmaking occurs prior to the establishment of other laws and
institutions. See ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 55.
193. See id. at 14 ("The higher lawmaking track ... is designed with would-be re\·oluuonancs in
mind. It employs special procedures for determining whether a mobiliud majority of the cmz.cnry gt\"e thel!
considered suppon to the principles that one or another rc\•olutionary movement would pronounce m the
people's name.").
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through special constitutional convention processes. Constitutional politics is
considered to correspond to a higher level of popular deliberation and
consensus, and as such, is distinguishable from ordinary politics. This
conception relies heavily upon the circumstances of the American
Founding. 194 In the prevailing contemporary paradigm, there is a strong claim
for linkage between meaningful political change and constitutional change. The
constitutional ideal is forward-looking; the purpose is to put the past behind
and to move to a brighter future. Constitutionmaking is conceived as the
foundation of the new democratic order.
Although its claims have been universalized, contemporary constitutional
theory itself derives from a distinctive political context, specifically the
eighteenth-century revolutions. Whereas the modem understanding does not
define constitutionalism as a state's political arrangements, as in the classical
understanding, the modern vision of constitutional politics is inextricably
connected to particular revolutions and past political orders. 195 Yet the view
of constitutions as foundational to liberalizing political change offers only a
theoretical resolution to the dilemma posed by postrevolutionary
constitutionmaking. 196 The dominant model is highly idealized, and as such
cannot account for many constitutional phenomena associated with periods of
political transformation. Instead, contemporary constitutionalism necessitates
rethinking the prevailing theorizing about the relation of political to
constitutional change. With constitutions in their third generation, constitutional
precedents of the late twentieth century suggest that the model overstates the
differences between ordinary and constitutional politics. As the next Section
demonstrates, instances of constitutionalism in periods of substantial political
change reveal diverse manifestations of constitutional politics.
194. This conception of constitutional politics depends on the view that the American constitutional
conventions implied broad popular consensus. This claim is somewhat controversial, as some scholars
suggest the constitutional ratification elections were marked by low voter turnout. See Peter Berkowitz,
Book Review, 26 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 692, 695 (1993) (reviewing I BRUCH A. ACKERMAN, WB
THI! Pl!OPLI!: FOUNDATIONS (1991)).
Perhaps the processes considered to be predicates of constitutional foundationalism ought to be
interpreted at a higher level of generality. Understood this way, low participation in constitutional
ratification processes would not be fatal, so long as participation is better than the ordinary political
participation of the time. As is discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 223-24, a transitional
perspective helps to explain why in periods of political upheaval, even limited popular participation may
well suffice to legitimate constitutional transformation.
'
195. Although the American experience is thought to exemplify foundational constitutlonmaklng, In
recent years a broader prescriptive claim has been leveled at other states in the process of transition. Thus,
in Tile Future of Liberal Revolution, the foundationalist vision is extended to the contemporary post·
Communist transitions. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1. Invoking the United Statcs's constitutlonmaklng,
Ackerman exhons fledgling East European democracies to put aside ordinary politics and to cap their
revolutions with a constitution. See id. at 193. For a related continental argument along Ackerman lines,
see ULRICH PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL Rl!VOLUTJON (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1995).
196. Further, despite the contribution of contemporary constitutional theory to the political science
debate over the criteria for liberalizing change, see supra text accompanying notes 10-13, this Article
contends that liberalizing political change is associated with varieties of legal responses, beyond the
constitutional.
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B. A Transitional Counteraccount
Here I propose another account of a transitional constitutionalism, which
better captures constitutional politics associated with transfonnative periods.
Constitutionalism in periods of radical political change reflects transitionality
in its processes and normative commitments. In transitional constitutional
processes, as developments in periods of political upheaval suggest,
constitutions are not created all at once, but in fits and starts.
Constitutionmaking often begins with a provisional constitution, predicated
upon the understanding of subsequent, more pennanent constitutions. Despite
our ordinary notions of constitutional law as the most forward-looking and
enduring of legal forms, transitional constitutionmaking is frequently
impermanent, and involves gradual change. Many constitutions that emerge in
periods of political transformations are explicitly intended as interim measures.
Whereas the prevailing model conceives of constitutions as monolithic and
enduring, some features of transitional constitutions are provisional, while
others become more entrenched over time.
Transitionality has normative implications. Within prevailing theory,
constitutionalism is commonly understood as unidirectional, forward-looking,
and fully prospective. Once retrospective political understandings are included,
the contemporary ideal becomes a poor model for transitional constitutional
phenomena. The picture of a polis at constitutional point zero might have been
appropriate for describing constitutionalism in the eighteenth century, but in
the late twentieth century, constitutions associated with political change
generally succeed preexisting constitutional regimes and are thus not simply
created anew.
The construction of new constitutional arrangements in periods of radical
political change is informed by a transitional conception of constitutional
justice. Constitutional law is commonly conceptualized as the most forwardlooking form of law. Yet transitional constitutionalism is ambivalent in its
directionality; for the revolutionary generation, the content of principles of
constitutional justice relates back to past injustice. From a transitional
perspective, what is considered constitutionally just is contextual and
contingent, relating to the attempt to transfonn legacies of past injustice.
The study of constitutionalism in periods of political change suggests that
transitional modalities vary in constitutional continuity. 197 In its "codifying"
modality, constitutionalism expresses existing consensus, rather than
transformative purpose. In its transfonnative modality, in "critical"
constitutionalism, the successor constitution explicitly reconstructs the political

197. The constitutional types proposed here, like Wcbcrian uJcal 1ypcs. do not lay c1'11m to
comprehending all constitutional phenomena but rather arc offered for their help in understanding d1vcr!C
constitutional phenomena.
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order associated with injustice. 198 In another transformative form, where
successor constitutions are used to return to the pre-predecessor constitutional
order, such constitutionalism might be considered as "restorative." Where the
successor constitution is a holdover from prior rule, one might consider these
manifestations of constitutional continuity to be "residual." As review of
illustrative constitutional developments in periods of political flux will show,
many transitional constitutions incorporate aspects of more than one of the
proposed types. These constitutional constructions mediate periods of political
change.
My aim here is to interpret how states move from illiberal regimes to those
that are more liberal, and to explore the role constitutions play in constructing
these political changes. Below, I explore a number of cases that illuminate the
nature and role of constitutionalism in periods of political transformation. The
phenomenon of transitional constitutionalism goes back to ancient times, to the
account of the constitution written after the Athenian revolution. 199 With such
historical transitions crune the dilemma of squaring revolutionary political
change with constitutionmaking. As we shall see, similar gradual constitutional
processes take place in contemporary transitions.

1. Brokering out of Authoritarian Rule
In contemporary theorizing, the constitutional ideal is the culmination of
the revolution, and the foundation of the new democratic order. The
constitution somehow transcends its politicized origins, as constitutional
politics transcends ordinary politics. By contrast, in the realist model, the
nature and role of constitutions in negotiated transitions is largely conceived
in political terms, and constitutions are conceived as extensions of ordinary
politics. 200 The two prevailing views take opposing positions on the place of
constitutionalism in transformative politics. Neither model, however,
adequately explains the nature of constitutional politics in contemporary
political change. Exrunining the role of constitutions in periods of
postauthoritarian rule illuminates the constructivist constitutional paradigm. 201
While constitutionmaking is shaped by periods of radical political change, it
also helps construct the political opening that allows transition.
Transitional constitutions broker the political shifts from authoritarian rule.
They construct interim periods of substantial liberalizing political change,
198. In Parts I and II, I have described transfonnative legal responses in adjudicative and punitive
fonns. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37, 51-55, 104-08, 159, 172.
199. With the revolution, there was much debate about the nature of the desired political system. The
debate culminated in two draft constitutions, one for the "immediate" crisis and another "for the future."
See ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION chs. 29-33 (P.J. Rhodes trans., 1984).
200. For such a scholarly approach, see generally LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 1, at 10; and
O'DONNELL & SCHMITIER, supra note 10.
201. For a discussion of this tenn, see supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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albeit not equivalent to a fully democratic order. Such constitutions are
transitional in a number of senses: Their processes are plainly transient; their
instruments are at least in part provisional. Such constitutions frequently suffer
from features held over from the predecessor constitutional regime. features
one might consider residual. Examples of such constitutions arise in Europe's
historical negotiated transitions, as well as in the more recent wave of political
change.
Although war provides the distinct break frequently considered a threshold
to constitutional foundation, political shifts often occur without such ruptures.
following prolonged and tortuous political negotiations. Transitional
constitutions may emerge in the negotiated shifts out of authoritarian rule.
Where the prior regime has not collapsed, and where the policical shifc occurs
only as a result of negotiations, constitutions play a role not well accounted for
within prevailing constitutional theory. 202 Transitional conslitutions are not
simply revolution-stoppers, but they also play a role in constructing the
transition. Early in the process, constitutions can jump start and instigate
political change. Insofar as such constitutions destabilize rather Chan scabilize
a political order, the transitional cons!itution 's "disentrenching" role is
analogous to the ordinary codifying constitution's "entrenching" role in this
respect.
A contemporary illustration of the "disentrenching" constitution is
postapartheid South Africa. Likened to a "hiscoric bridge between the past of
a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human righcs. democracy
and peaceful co-existence ... for all South Africans," 203 South Africa's
postapartheid Constitution exemplifies the uses of transitional constitulions
following authoritarian rule. The Constitution embodies the political agreement
and shift from minority rule over a disenfranchised population to a
representative democracy. This constitutional pact enabled the political
transformation to occur. To what extent can new constitutional legitimacy
derive from an agreement ratified by the old apartheid-era Parliament? To what
extent would the procedural linkage to the past regime compromise
constitutional processes? The transitional constitution's origins in the apartheid
regime are mitigated by its express provisionality. Constitutional change began
with the old Parliament's enactment of an interim constitution, itself predicated
upon the making of another, prospective constitution.w;
202. For an account based on the path of the transition, sec LINZ & STEPAN, :supra note 1.
203. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 15, § 251 ("National Unity and Rcconc1liauon") (1993). Other consmuuonal
arrangements reflecting such political compromise rue provisions contemplating conunuation of the
executive power, overseen by a Transitional Executive Council. See id. ch. 15, § 235.
204. The Constitution's preamble contemplates that it will be m force pending a final consutuuon.
"Whereas it is necessary for such purposes that provision should be made for the promotion of natmnal
unity and the restructuring and continued governance of South Afnca wl11/e an eltcud Cons11ruhona/
Assembly draws up a final Constitution ...." Id. preamble (emphasis added).
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South Africa's 1993 transitional Constitution reflected complex modalities.
Although generally provisional, it included binding constitutional
principles. 205 These binding principles related in large part to equality and
representation rights. By reaffirming the protection of racial and ethnic groups,
the Constitution transformed the legacy of racial prejudice in the move out of
repressive apartheid, 206 setting forth enduring liberal constitutional
values. 207
Transitional constitutions have been particularly useful in political
movements from military rule. In the Southern European transitions, for
example, the first post-Franco Constitution of 1978 helped to steer Spain out
of military rule. 208 The first successor Constitution's transitionality is
reflected in the absence of a complete withdrawal of military power; while the
military is made subject to constitutional rule, much about the new power
sharing is left undefined. Similarly, the threshold question in Portugal's 1974
transition was whether the military would have a place in the successor
regime. 209 By creating a constitutional structure that made room for the
Armed Forces, the first postrevolutionary Constitution enabled the transition
205. Indeed, the transition of the Constitution has been an ongoing question. The contemplated second
Constitution was held invalid by the country's Constitutional Coun pursuant to the transitional
Constitution's animating principles. See In re Cenification of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 744 (CC) (S. Afr.). The revised final Constitution was ccnified shortly before this
Article's publication. See id. In its structure, South Africa's first postapanheid Constitution shares affinities
with Germany's postwar constitution. Despite its transitional nature, Germany's Basic Law also entrenched
core provisions guiding the state's liberal political identity. See GRUNDOESETZ [Constitution) [GO) art.
79(3) (F.R.G.) (so-called perpetuity clause); infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
206. Schedule 4 sets fonh "Constitutional Principles" not to be altered or contradicted by any
subsequent constitution, such as:
The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender and all other forms of discrimination and
shall promote racial and gender equality and national unity.

The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal
process. Equality before the law includes laws, programmes or activities that have as their
object the amelioration of the conditions of the disadvantaged, including those disadvantaged
on the grounds of race, colour or gender.
s. AFR. INTERIM CONST., Act 209 of 1993, sched. 4, pts. III & v, reprinted in DION BASSON, SOUTH
AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION: TEXT AND NOTES (1994).
207. Indeed, the way the constitutional consolidation process is expected to work was clarified In the
Constitutional Coun's decision invalidating the subsequent proposed constitution. See supra note 205.
208. See ANDREA BONIME-BLANC, SPAIN'S TRANSITTON TO DEMOCRACY: THE PoLmcs OP
CONSTITUTION-MAKING 31 (1987); Jordi Sole Tura, Iberian Case Study: The Constitutionalism of
Democratization, in CoNSTJTUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 174, at 287, 292-94. See generally
O'DONNELL & SCHMrITER, supra note 10, at 37-72. The subjection of the military to civilian rule Is
incomplete, however: the Constitution contemplates military power to protect the constitutional order.
According to Article I 04 of the Spanish Constitution,
The Security Forces and Corps which are instruments of the Government shall have the mission
of protecting the free exercise of rights and libenies and that of guaranteeing the security of the
citizens....
An organic law shall determine the functions, basic principles of action and the Statutes
of the Security Forces and Corps.
CONSTITUCJ6N art. 104 (Spain).
209. For an account of the transition, see Maxwell, supra note 130, at 109-37.
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to democracy by structuring the allocation of military and civilian power. 210
Throughout Latin America, transitional constitutions have served to broker the
way between military and civilian regimes. An example is Brazil after military
rule. 211 Through the Constitution's limits on state power that previously led
to abuses, the authoritarian structure was reconstructed to effect political
transformation. 212 The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 was concededly
provisional: After five years, there was to be constitutional review with an eye
to amendment. According to the reigning constitutional model, the provisional
nature of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution defeated a written constitution's basic
purpose: to preserve a distinct vision of state power over time. 213 From a
transitional perspective, this critique is inapposite. Where a political regime is
not yet consolidated, it makes little sense to insist on constitutional
permanence. To the contrary, the constitutional opening may well be
contingent upon its transience. The possibility of reform associated with the
first interim constitution is predicated upon and bounded by the assumption of
a deferred, more plenary constitutional process. Chile's contemporary
Constitution dramatically illustrates this possibility. Its 1991 Constitution
helped to extricate the country from rule by military dictatorship, but only at
a constitutional cost. The first transitional Constitution maintained some
residual continuity with past rule by accommodating military dictatorship
within its constitutional structure. This transitional change enabled
civilian/military power sharing and the move to a more liberal democratic
regime. 214

210. See Tura, supra note 208, at 291-92.
211. For an overview of the tranSition and an analysis of the 1988 Constituuon, sec Keith S. Roscnn,
Brazil's New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Sociery. 38 AM.
1. COMP. L. 773 (1990).
212. For examples of new limits placed on the exercise of states of siege. sec Amcles 136 and 137
as well as the presidential lawmaking associated with states of emergency. The Consrnuuon of Brazil
provides: "Legislative power is exercised by the National Congress ...." CoNSTITUlc;AO FEDERAL
[Constitution) [C.F.J art. 44 (Braz.). Article 62 provides:
In important and urgent cases, the President of the Republic may adopt pr0\'i51onal measures
that have the force of Jaw; however, he must immediately resubmit them to the Nauonal
Congress which, if it is in recess, shall be convened in special session in order to meet wtthm
5 days ....
Provisional measures shall Jose their effectiveness as of the date of pubhcauon 1f they arc
not converted into Jaw within 30 days from the date of their publication, and the Nauonal
Congress shall make provisions to regulate any legal relationship !hat may stem from such
measures.
Id. an. 62.
213. For an example of this argument, sec Roscnn, supra note 211, at 783.
214. In a delicate series of constitutional amendments negouatcd between the ruhng nuhtary Junta and
the opposition groups lay the glimmerings of the return to democracy m Clulc. The cons111uuonal
amendments limited the power of the military, as well as other msutuuons supponmg m1htary rule. and
lifted the ban on opposition parties in the Senate. For a bncf O\•crv1ew of the ncgouauons. sec Clu/e:
Chronology 1988--1991, in IV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 33-36 (Alben p
Blaustein & Gilben H. Aanz eds., 1991 ). Anicle 9 on political parties was amended. as were Aruclcs 95
and 96, which had the effect of weakening the National Secunty Council.
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Colombia provides a good historical illustration of disentrenching
constitutional change. Analogized to a treaty, the recent Constitution of
Colombia truly enabled the peace. A longstanding political crisis between the
government and the guerrillas exploded in the 1980s with the partial collapse
of the state. 215 The political crisis signaled the need for overhaul of the
constitution, but the problem was how to enact constitutional reforms without
the support of the Congress and in contravention of existing constitutional
law. 216 As is characteristic of transitional constitutionmaking, Colombia
departed from its preexisting constitutional procedures to allow interim
constitutional change, pending greater constitutional reforms. 217 These
ingenious measures constituted the transition; they opened a political space and
provisionally constrained the political process in a way that permitted the shift
to freer democratic rule. The Colombian Constitution embodied a boldly
constructive mechanism for political transformation. Self-consciously
provisional, it was intended to restructure an unstable political order. 218
Transitory provisions laid down rules for the first free elections, reconstituted
the political order, granted amnesty for past political crimes,219 and
reintegrated demobilized guerrillas. Constitutionalism first implied
disentrenchment, followed by reconstitution.
The transitional constitutions discussed above are explicitly political. For
example, they all ratify features of political agreements. 220 The politicized
nature of such constitutions is also evident in their affinities with transitional
criminal measures. In shifts out of harsh rule, transitional constitutions often
ratify amnesties of past political offenses. Thus in transitional times,
constitutions delineate the parameters of what is permissibly political and,
consequently, what is unjust. In the context of these political changes,
constitutions serve not as the culmination or endstage of revolution but rather
as actors in the construction of the transformation. As such, these constitutions
215. See Daniel T. Fox & Anne Stetson, The 1991 Constitutional Refonn: Prospects for Democracy
and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 139, 143-44 (1992).
216. See William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New Colombian Constitution: Democratic Victory
or Popular Surrender?, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39, 55 (1991).
217. Going outside prevailing procedures under Colombian law, a referendum on constitutional change
was put on the ballot in the May 1990 elections. See id. at 56-57. By this referendum, a popular decision
was made to elect a constituent assembly to redraft the constitution. The referendum was followed by
elections to the constituent assembly. See id. at 57. By then, the former guerilla movement had demobilized,
had made a strong showing as an independent force in electoral politics, and ultimately would take an
activist role in the constitutionmaking. See Fox & Stetson, supra note 215, at 142, 145.
218. Because the central abuses lay in the allocation of executive/legislative power, the new
Constitution gave the President extraordinary legislative powers, as well as creating a new "mini-congress,''
to take effect until the installation of a new congress.
219. See CoNSTITUCI6N transitory art. 6 (Colom.) (describing National Constituent Assembly); id.
transitory art. 39 (vesting President with "extraordinary powers" to "issue decrees with the force of law"
for three months); id. transitory art. 30 (concerning amnesties).
220. Political agreements are often contemporaneous with transitional constitutions and directive of
subsequent constitutional change. As such agreements are generally not subject to broad political
participation, this challenges the sense in which constitutionmaking is democratic.
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are frequently explicit provisional measures that facilitate political
transformation. Successor constitutions delimit provisional political agreements
and structures, creating a new political space constructive of the political
transition. The superentrenching of certain critical constitutional nonns reflects
boldly constructive responses to past repressive rule. While the concededly
transitional nature of the balance of these constitutions chiefly relates to
structures of state power, the normative principles relating to individual rights
norms are intended to be transformative and enduring, guiding the state's
liberal democratic identity. There is a higher law, higher even than the
constitution, that could be understood as the "constitution's constitution."
Transitional constitutionmaking, to some extent, provides a reflection of
prevailing ideas about the state and political change. Unlike the dominant
constitutional model, the transitional constitution is flexible in the
entrenchment of norms, as seen in the emergence of interim or provisional
constitutional phases regarding controversial questions of a constitutional
nature. Over time, a first round of constitutional changes can further transform
the political scene, enabling greater constitutional change. 221 Finally, rather
than expressing existing popular consensus, these constitutions' normative
principles are best accounted for within a transitional account, as their very
purposes are bound up in constitutionalism's transformative possibilities.

2.

Victor:S Constitutional Justice

The course of constitutionmaking after war appears to follow the idealized
sequence of rupture and new beginnings. Although postwar constitutionalism
implies a "clean break," it hardly implies the superdemocratic processes and
popular sovereignty predicates of the contemporary constitutional model. Two
illustrations discussed here are postwar West Germany and Japan, which
adopted constitutional schemes following Allied victory and unconditional
surrender. Both the West German and the Japanese Constitutions illustrate a
distinctive transitional constitutionalism: the "victor's" constitution. To varying
degrees, these are imposed constitutions. The postwar Constitutions'
transitional purposes are seen in their heightened critical function: As is
reflected in their substantive mandates, both West Germany's Basic Law and
Japan's 1946 Constitution were expressly designed to transform past repressive
legacies.
Perhaps the extreme case of victor's constitutional justice is the postwar
Japanese Constitution. Adopted under almost absolute American domination,
drafted by a small group under General Douglas MacArthur's direction, and
221. While the constructivist constitutional par.id1gm proposc:<l hen: is drawn from inductive reasoning,
based upon comparative analysis of a variety of societal pr.icuccs m pcnO<is of pohucal change, ll bears
similarities to the theoretical model of gradual constituuonal conscnsus-buildmg processes proposed by
Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 133-72.
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forced upon the Japanese Parliament for ratification, 222 the 1946 Japan
Constitution cannot be understood as an expression of popular sovereignty in
this occupation context. 223 Despite undemocratic constitutional beginnings,
the postwar Constitution's continuing authority suggests that other mechanisms
operate to legitimate victors' constitutions over time. To some extent, the
victor's constitution exemplified by postwar Japan is simply a more extreme
version of a constitutional process that, in this century, is common to
transitions. In periods of political transition, after war or repressive rule,
constitutional processes are often mediated by occupying powers or other
influential countries. 224 The leverage of the mediating actor affects the sense
in which constitutionmaking processes represent popular sovereignty. Perhaps
the legitimacy of postwar constitutions devolves upon their mandates, and the
degree to which these constitutional processes nurture democracy and create
norms to shape the transition's political structure. In this respect, much of the
postwar Japanese Constitution reflects a transitional modality that I previously
have characterized as transformative and critical. 225 The Constitution's
explicit purposes were to transform the political tendency toward militarism
and imperial nationalism. Thus, Japan's warmaking power is renounced
completely,226 and its Emperor reduced from a near deity to a
figurehead. 227 There is a broad attempt to displace the prior legal regime, and
to move Japan to a formally more egalitarian democracy. 228
The 1946 Japanese Constitution evinces several critical aspects in
presenting a retributive response to the prior regime. The Constitution's
delimiting of the Emperor's powers appears as an express alternative to
criminal justice. 229 In limiting the Emperor's powers, the new Constitution
222. For a comprehensive account of Japan's constitutionmaking history, sec KYOKO INOUB,
MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINOUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKINO (1991).
223. The significance of popular participation in constitutionmaking may well be less in states with
a tradition of authoritarian rule. Like MacArthur's constitution, Japan's previous Meiji Constitution had also
been drafted in private by a handful of elites. See id. at 51.
224. Perhaps the mildest form of such mediation is the contemporary constitutional advisory role
played by international, national, and nongovernmental actors. For an example from the post-Communist
transitions, see Holmes, supra note 2. For an indictment of "expert" constitutions for their failure to
establish authority and stability, see ARENDT, supra note 9, at 144-45.
225. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
226. See KENPO [Constitution] ch. III, art. 9 (Japan).
227. Chapter I of the Japanese Constitution concerns the Emperor. Under Article 1, he is made the
"symbol of the State." Id. ch. I, art. 1. Article 3 states: "The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be
required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor." lei.
ch. I, art. 3. Article 4 states: "The Emperor shall ... not have powers related to government." Id. ch. I, art.

4.
228. For example, Article 14 states: "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no
discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family
origin."; "Peers and peerage shall not be recognized."; "No privilege shall accompany any award of
honour ...." Id. ch. I, an. 14.
229. This response evokes the affinities between criminal justice and constitutional lawmaking in
periods of political upheaval. As discussed earlier, constitutions have been used to recognize past criminal
wrongdoing, while also pardoning such offenses. In such instances, the constitution circumscribes the
parameters of permissible democratic politics. See supra notes 172, 219-20, and accompanying text.
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provided a compromise for the threat of punishment that had destabilized the
imperial role. 230 Like the eighteenth-century trials of kings, constitutional
limits on imperial sovereignty drew a normative line between prior rule and
the new regime. Successor constitutionmaking, like trials, offered formal,
public legitimation of the transformation from the implicated political
systems. 231
Victor's justice would not be as complete in Germany. Although Germany
surrendered unconditionally, subsequent Cold War political change gave it
leverage over its constitutional reconstruction. The occupying powers instigated
but did not control constitutional reconstruction. Thus, despite Allied calls for
the convening of a constituent assembly to draft a constitution to be adopted
by popular plebiscite, Germany resisted the demand for a permanent
constitution, adopting instead the so-called Basic Law, which was avowedly
enacted as a transitory document. 232 Hence the Basic Law's provisionality
cannot be fully accounted for within the prevailing constitutional model. The
proposed paradigm of transitional constitutionalism, however, illuminates the
Basic Law's normative commitments. Its dominant purpose was transformative:
to counter the abuses of power that enabled the past regime's evil. 233 As
such, the Basic Law follows the critical constitutional type introduced above.
Further, unlike the eighteenth-century constitutions, in the Basic Law the
normative constitutional concern regarding the potential threat to democracy
transcends the abuses of state power to the polity itself. The sense in which
this concern responds to the prior repression is best explained from a
transitional perspective.
The meaning of constitutional justice from a transitional perspective is
conceptualized and constructed in terms of prior constitutional and political
regimes. In Germany, the lessons of the Weimar Republic steered the postwar
constitutional course. 234 Responding to this legacy, the Basic Law
aggressively countered the fascist tendencies in the political order that
culminated in Nazi dictatorship. In the Basic Law, presidential powers are
rendered largely symbolic. Similar to the postwar Japanese Constitution's
230. See IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT 153-76 (1994).
231. See supra Pan II for the comparative role of tnals m trans1uon. Su genuall.Y WAR CRL\IES
BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 129, at 257-82 (listing sources on war cnmes tnals m Asta)
232. See BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ( 1949), traru/aud m PETER H.
MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC app. at 213 (1963) [hcrctnaf!Cr BASIC LAW) ('"[T)he
to give a new order
German people ... has, by vinue of its constituent power, cnaC!ed this Baste Law
to political life for a transitional period.") (emphasis added). The Baste Law was intended to be raufied

by state legislatures, with plenary constitutionmaking processes postponed unul after the country's
prospective reunification; but the constitutional moment of raufication ne,·cr am\"ed. Su MERKL. supra.
at 3-19 (1963); see also CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY IN UNIFIED GERMANY (Klaus H Goetz & Pe!Cr J Cullen
eds., 1995) (collecting articles on German constitutionalism).
233. See MERKL, supra note 232, at 22-24, 80-89.
234. Fascism's success is commonly aUributed to the Weimar constituuonal scheme. which combined
a strong executive with a weak legislative branch, enabling the nsc of subverst\"e movements Su. e g , 1d
at 23.
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treatment of its wartime Emperor, the Federal President is bereft of power, the
wartime institution deposed, and power diffused more broadly to the
Parliament.235 As with Japan's postwar constitution, Germany's Basic Law
also reflects the sense in which criminal and constitutional mechanisms posit
fully alternative responses to prior evil rule. Both punishment and
constitutionmaking construct normative limits on past abuses of state
power. 236 Detailed rights provisions prohibit the racial and religious
persecution rampant under the Nazi regime. 237 While such equality rights are
common to modem constitutions, the Basic Law goes beyond the conventional
protections. The normative structure created by the Basic Law has been
characterized as a "militant" democracy. 238 "Militant democracy" may appear
to be a paradoxical construct, but it captures the sense of the instrument's
primarily transformative purposes. 239 Transitional constitutionalism operates
differently from our prevailing intuitions about the role of constitutionalism.
Protection against similar future persecution is not limited to the enumeration
of individual rights; transitional constitutions set limits not only upon the
political majority, but also upon an illiberal polity. The view that fascism was
a political expression of a populist nature leads to the attempt to constrain such
expression, even where it is that of a supermajority; a seemingly paradoxical
endeavor in the service of constitutional democracy. Adopted as a provisional
constitutional instrument, the Basic Law nonetheless reflects varying degrees
of transitionality and constitutional entrenchment. Some constitutional norms
are provisional, whereas others relating to the instrument's animating
normative liberal values, such as protection of individual rights of dignity and
equality, are utterly unamendable and superentrenched, 240 thereby defining

235. Chapter V, entitled 'The Federal President," consists of eight aniclcs. Aniclc 61 relates to
impeachment. See BASIC LAW, supra note 232, an. 61; see also MERKL, supra note 232, at 178-82.
236. Postwar sovereignty would be restored when the Allies ended occupied trials, and Germany
committed to constitutionmaking. For a historical account, see BUSCHER, supra note 161.
237. For example, Article 3(3) provides: "No one may be prejudiced or privileged because of his sex,
his descent, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith or his rellgious and political
opinions." BASIC LAW, supra note 232, an. 3(3). Anicle 4(1) provides: "Freedom of faith and conscience
and freedom of creed in religion and in philosophy of life (weltansc/1aulic/1e) are inviolable." Id. an. 4(1).
238. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OP THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OP
GERMANY 218 (2d ed. 1997). For an illustration of this constitutional principle in a decision of the
country's Federal Constitutional Coun, see Socialist Reich Pany Case, Bundesvcrfassungsgcricht [BVerfOE]
2, I (1952) (F.R.G.), translated in KOMMERS, supra, at 218. See also Donald P. Kommcrs, Gennan
Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 854 (1991).
239. Although the Basic Law placed democratic conditions on both individuals and political panics,
antiliberal elements were excluded from political life. A militant constitutional order is vigilant not only
to the excesses of state power, but also to those of popular sovereignty. Thus political panics which "by
reason of their aims or the conduct of their adherents, seek to impair or do away with the free democratic
basic order or threaten the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be unconstitutional." BASIC
LAW, supra note 232, an. XXI, § 2. Moreover, individuals forfeit their constitutional rights to expression
where there is abuse of the use of speech, press, teaching and assembly "in order to undermine the free
democratic basic order." Id. an. XVIII.
240. See BASIC LAW, supra note 232, an. LXXIX, § 3 (setting fonh "eternity" or "perpetuity" clause
referring to unamendability of "basic principles" laid down in Aniclcs I and XX).
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the state's liberal political identity. 2 ~ 1 Germany's Basic Law, as interpreted
by the country's Constitutional Court, becomes the guardian of the liberal state.
These postwar constitutions illustrate constitutionalism in its third century.
In the move from authoritarian rule, set against a backdrop of prior
constitutional regimes, such constitutionalism plays a distinctive critical
function: It is boldly reconstructive of past constitutional tendencies identified
with illiberal politics. While postauthoritarian constitutionmaking often lacks
the legitimacy afforded by full constitutional processes predicated in the
foundationalist model, delegitimation of the predecessor regime clears the path
for constitutional reconstruction. The postwar constitutions pose a problem for
the prevailing idealized constitutional model. These constitutions can hardly be
understood as full-blown expressions of a heightened popular consensus and
revolutionary agenda. Indeed, such constitutions would often seem to be just
the reverse. The absence of popular consensus in constitutionmaking processes,
and the failure of heightened democratic commitments implicit in the view of
constitutions as political foundations, is also borne out in such constitutions'
normative principles. Modem constitutions are generally conceived and
designed as structures to constrain state power, but transitional
postauthoritarian constitutions counter illiberal tendencies more broadly. In
realist theorizing, constitutions would be largely explained in terms of the
balance of political power. Yet the notion of constitutionalism as a product of
the balance of political power does not well explain cases of total transition,
such as those following war, unconditional surrender, or other regime collapse.
Further, both the idealist and realist models assume that the triumph of the
revolutionary regime over its predecessor implies fully forward-looking
constitutionmaking. As these constitutional normative structures are not well
explained by idealized types, nor by explanations in terms of current political
forces, they illuminate a distinctive transitional constitutionalism.
3.

Velvet Revolutions and Their Constiturions

What are the implications for constitutionalism of velvet revolutions? Like
many of the postauthoritarian transitions, the fall of Communism occurred
through the collapse of the prevailing Communist regime or negotiated political
change. 242 Political changes in the former Soviet bloc were largely peaceful,
and hence known as velvet revolutions. As such, constitutional change in the

241. Compare discussion of the South African postapanheid 1993 Constitution. supra notes 203--07
and accompanying text.
242. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 2. at 23-24. On the East European transmons. sec generaJJy
TIMOTHY GARTON AsH, THE MAGIC LANTERN: THE REVOLUTION OF '89 WITNESSED IS WAASAW,
BUDAPEST, BERLIN, AND PRAGUE (1990); EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION (l\'O Barne ed .• 1992); JOHN
FEFFER, SHOCK
AVES: EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS (1992); and KEN Jowm. NEW
WORLD DISORDER (1992).

w
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area did not follow the dominant constitutional model patterned on eighteenthcentury-style revolution. The velvet revolutions generally lacked clean breaks,
and as such did not culminate in constitutional change of a foundational sort.
Years after the political changes, and in much of the region, the story is of
constitutional continuity. What emerges is an initial transitional
constitutionalism displaying aspects largely of a residual type. Even states in
the more advanced stages of economic reform still rely on amended
Communist-era documents. 243
What does smooth political change-or velvet revolution-imply about the
attendant constitutional change? Whereas revolution by violent means implies
rupture in the constitutional regime, velvet revolution implies forced continuity
instead. The dilemma of the tension between constitutionalism and political
change disappears, for there is no discontinuity, only constitutional continuity.
As in other negotiated transitions, constitutions play a role in ratifying the
agreements constructing the political shift,244 as well as in restoring the
prerevolutionary constitutional order. 245
243. Hungary, for example, is still functioning under a much-amended Constitution of the Soviet
period. See Andrew Arato, The Constitution-Making Endgame in Hungary, E. EUR. CONST. RBV., Fall
1996, at 31. See generally Peter Paczolay, 171e New Hungarian Constitutional State: Challenges and
Perspectives, in CONSTITUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE 21 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1993): Edith
Oltay, Toward the Rule of Law-Hungary, RFE/RL REs. REP., July 3, 1992, at 16. Poland has been
functioning under the so-called Little Constitution, an interim constitution limited to clarifying the structure
of the prevailing political system. Portions of its 1952 Constitution, particularly the individual rights
provisions, still prevail. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the
Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 595 (1991). As of the date of this
Article's publication, there was still no consensus on a charter of rights and freedoms. See Andrzej
Rzeplinski, 171e Polish Bill of Rights and Freedoms: A Case Study of Constitution-Making in Poland, E.
EUR. CONST. REV., Summer 1993, at 26; see also Wiktor Osiatynski, A Bill of Rights for Poland, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Fall 1992, at 29. In Russia, the struggle over the legitimacy of the country's Soviet-era
Parliament and Constitution led to a crisis culminating in violent extraconstitutional resolution. See
generally Dwight Semler, 171e End of the First Russian Republic, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1993/Winter
1994, at 107; Vera Tolz, 171e Moscow Crisis and the Future of Democracy in Russia, RFE/RL RES. RBP.
Oct. 22, 1993, at I. In Estonia, 1992 elections were held in accordance with the Communist Constitution
of 1938. The September 20, 1992, elections for President and members of the Parliament were conducted
according to the 1938 Constitution. See Constitution Watch, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1992, at 2, 5. In
Albania, as of the fall of 1994, a new constitution had not yet been enacted. See Constitution Watch, E.
EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1994, at 2. A transitional "Law on Major Constitutional Provisions" remains in
force.
244. See generally Paczolay, supra note 243, at 21; Jon Bister, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe:
An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447 (1991) (presenting account and analysis of transition to
constitutional democracies in Eastern Europe). For the majority of states in the former Soviet bloc, the
move to a democratically elected regime occurred through round table talks between the Communist Party
and opposition. See generally THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE BREAKDOWN OP COMMUNISM (Jon Bister
ed., 1996) (providing comprehensive account of bargaining process enabling transition). In Hungary, the
process of concluding the negotiations with a draft constitution took place in a process continually
threatened by the possible breakdown of political consensus. As such, the constitutional amending process
lacked prolonged deliberation, ending in speedy consideration in the Parliament where the amended
document was adopted. See Arato, supra note 88, at 685.
245. See Andr;is Saj6, Preferred Generations: A Paradox of Restoration Constitutions, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 847, 853-57 (1993). For a discussion regarding the phenomena of constitutional continuity In East
Central Europe, see generally ULRICH K. PREUSS, RBVOLUTION, FORTSCHRITT UNO VERPASSUNO ( 1990);
and Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arising from the Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 189, at 165.
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Post-Communist constitutionalism reveals several affinities between
theories of political and constitutional change. Just as political change occurred
in domino fashion after the Soviet collapse, so too there is a domino quality
to the constitutionalism prevalent throughout the region. Constitutional change
occurred through negotiation; as such, it did not rely on popular sovereignty.
On the contrary, the first such constitutional change occurred through
bargaining conducted by representatives of a political elite. In the velvet
revolutions, the predecessor regime was dislodged rather than overthrown.
Constitutional amendments ratified the move from one political regime to
another. In the negotiated transitions, the first constitutional changes involved
disentrenching the prior political order from power and constitutionalizing the
move to power sharing. 246 Thus post-Communist constitutional change has
less to do with delimiting state power than party power. This first round of
constitutional change was provisional, reflecting affinities with other
transitional legal responses. Constitutional processes in the region were not the
culminating stage in revolutionary change, but instead were inextricably linked
to gradual political processes. Constitutional change was so closely associated
with political change that it implied a constitutional politics not readily
distinguishable from ordinary politics. 247 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of
constitutional changes did not appear to be affected by this similarity. Rather
than following the ideal of constitutionmaking as a foundational expression of
a preexisting political consensus, here constitutional amendment comes first,
laying a foundation for further political change. Thus the constitutionalism of
the velvet revolutions challenges foundationalist understandings of the relation
of constitution and revolution.
There is another face to post-Communist constitutionalism, that of
"restoration" constitutionalism. In the former Czechoslovakia, the revolution
began in November 1989 with a demonstration commemorating the fiftieth
anniversary of the closing of the Czech universities by occupying German
forces. These auspicious beginnings underscored the deep historical sense of
political occupation pervading the region. Upon the end of political occupation,
there was a virtually automatic revival of the constitutional order that preceded
the occupation. I call this dimension of transitional constitutionalism

246. Throughout the region, constitutional amendments eliminated the constituuonally pnvtlegcd role
of the Communist Pany. The amendment processes m Hungary and Poland, for example, first and foremost
took power away from the dominant Communist party, and sought to protect those m the pohucal mmonty
See Elster, supra note 244, at 457-58. In this regard, there are affinities with Gcnnany's postwar Basic Law
and the constitutional responses to totalitarianism.
247. Hungary's constitutional change is explicitly described as "transiuonal"; so 100 the amendments
to the Poland's 1949 Stalin-era Constitution known as "the Lulic Constituuon." Only five Y= after the
revolution would Poland and Hungary begin to effect more comprehensive consutuuonal change. toward
a bill of rights. Regarding Hungary, see Constitution \\l::udr: Hungary, E. EUR. CONST. REv , \Vmtcr 1996,
at JO; and supra note 243. Regarding Poland, sec Constitution \\~tell: Poland, E. EUR. CoNST REv ..
Winter 1996, at 16-17.
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"restoration constitutionalism."248 In the post-Communist bloc, restoration
constitutionalism is rampant, implying a partial return to the pre-Bolshevik
constitutional regime. 249 Turning to restoration constitutions enabled countries
to eliminate the constitutional regime associated with Communism. However,
some countries returned to these old constitutional structures out of nostalgia
and the desire for stability. 250 Indeed, the very term "restoration" suggests the
normative pull of the old order. Yet the post-Communist restorations offer
dubious stability. Although these regimes may be expressions of traditional and
national identity, they can hardly be regarded as an expression of true existing
social consensus. Nevertheless, restoration constitutions have a normative pull
that manages to evade the dilemma of constitutional beginnings. To the extent
that such transitional constitutions are restorative, there are seemingly no
constitutional beginnings, only returns. Such constitutionalism eliminates the
tensions inherent in constitutionalism in periods of political change.
These cases illustrate varying modalities of transitional constitutionalism.
Where there is constitutional change, it has tended to occur not through special
bodies or procedures but in piecemeal fashion, through negotiations and
ordinary political processes. Such constitutional change has been inextricably
bound up with the processes of political change. Much of the remaining
constitutional order is residual, reflecting constitutional continuity. To the
extent that there has been transformative constitutional change away from the
prevailing political order, often it has been to revert to the constitutional and
political order that prevailed before totalitarianism, a form of restoration
constitutionalism.

4. The American Constitution: A Transitional Account
Finally, I tum to the American Constitution, the paradigmatic case of
foundational constitutionmaking. Despite this status, the American case does
not completely fit the dominant theoretical model, suggesting that the model
is incomplete and must be supplemented.

248. Restoration has certain affinities with the notion of "reactionary" change. See ALBERT 0.
HmscHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION 1-10 (1991) (discussing "reactionary" change).
249. In the fonner Czechoslovakia, the Constitution of 1920 became the basis of drafts for the "new"
Constitution after the revolution. See Lloyd Cutler & Hennan Schwartz, Constitutional Refonn in
Czeclwslovakia: E Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 531-36 (1991). In Latvia, a constitutional
hybrid of the 1922 Constitution, together with laws passed by the current parliament, has been in force
since May 1990. See Constitution Watch: Latvia, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1993, at 8-9. The 1938
Constitution was the basis for Estonia's constitutional draft. See Constitution Watch: Estonia, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Spring 1992, at 5. The basis for constitutional drafts in Georgia was the Constitution of 1921.
See Draft of Georgian Constitution (on file with Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern
Europe, Univ. of Chicago).
250. See Saj6, supra note 245, at 854-55 (arguing that restoration of such constitutions established
in East-Central Europe in 1989 were expressions of reactionary nationalism).
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Retelling the American constitutionmaking from a transitional perspective
adds a different narrative to the prevailing account. In the idealized version, the
American revolution culminates with constitutionmaking. The Constitution
embodies a putative immediacy bound up in the revolution, as well as a
permanence. 251 Yet the relationship between the United States Constitution
and the American Revolution reflects a transitional constitutionalism both in
its process and in its normative mandate. There was a stepwise progression
from a backward-looking constitutionalism toward a more forward-oriented
one. The Revolution did not immediately culminate with a foundational
constitution, but rather produced a number of constitutive documents. 252 In
the first postrevolutionary five-year period, the Articles of Confederation
constituted a transformative, critical response to a regime distinguished by
minimal state power. A more expansive scheme of state power was created
only upon the adoption of the Constitution of 1787. The addition of the Bill
of Rights 253 and the post-Civil War amendments to the American
Constitution represented yet additional constitutive stages.?S-1
Told this way, the story of the United States's constitutionmaking shares
some affinities with transitional constitutionalism. This transition was not as
dramatic, however, given the passage of time between the American
Revolution and the enactment of the Constitution, and the nature of the
American transition from limited monarchy rather than from the worst of
dictatorships. Such a transition seems markedly conservative compared to
others discussed here; 255 the American constitutional instrument itself reflects
this.
From a transitional perspective, the American Constitution is not a
monolithic Founding instrument, but a nuanced document. The depiction of
American constitutionmaking as a self-conscious founding glosses over the
pronounced conflict among the Framers as to their purposes. 256 Transitional
251. My description is no doubt an ovcrsimplilicauon of the Amencan cons111u11onal mood. For a
thoughtful account, see PAUL w. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 58-59 (1992), wluch argues that the
process of constitutionalism shifted from revolution 10 mamtcnance.
252. A sequence of constitutional changes put in mouon by the rc\•oluuon led 10 the adopuon of the
Constitution of 1787. The chain of constitutive documents begins with the Declarauon of lmkpendcnce's
statement of justification to break with the prior regime. Even when the Framers con,·encd m 1787, 11 was
with the purpose to amend the previous constitutive charter. Su RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, ARE WE TO BE
A NATION? THE MAKINO OF THE CONSTITIJTION l 06 ( 1987). For an argument that conunuuy between the
American Revolution and the United States Constitution was pan of a smgle pohucal e.~penence. sec David
A.J. Richards, Rei•o/ution and Consriturionalism in Ammca. 14 CARDOZO L. REv 577. 577-78 (1993)
253. Though some scholars suggest the 1787 Consutuuon mcorporatcs the Declarat1on. comparable
claims have not been made about the Articles of Confeder.mon Nevertheless. the Cons111uuon imphc1lly
assumes some continuity with the Articles; for example. the Union assumed all debts of the Confcderauon.
See U.S. CONST. an. VI,§ I.
254. See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text. For the claim that there arc three sui:h cons111uuve
stages, see ACKERMAN, supra note 194, at 40, 58.
255. For discussion of the continuum in lr.insitions m terms of vanance m extent of hbetallU!lg
change, see supra note 13.
256. Compare Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), m !llARVL~ MEYERS,
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISOS 175-79 (rev ed.
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analysis exposes the unseen Constitution, those parts steeped in the historical
and political contingencies of the day. That these provisions have been
generally overlooked by contemporary scholars may well attest to this transient
nature. A leading feature of the American Constitution's transitionality is its
provision for amendment. 257 Because the amendment process is difficult to
incorporate within the dominant account, it has occasioned lively scholarly
debate. 258 The paradigm proposed by this Article suggests that the
amendment process should not be considered in isolation, but in light of other
aspects of constitutional change. In the American constitutionmaking sequence,
the antecedent structural Constitution is the predicate to ultimate recognition
of individual rights.
Transitionality also marks the constitutional provisions regarding rights, the
leading transitional feature of which was the controversial issue of slavery. The
1787 Constitution postponed any change regarding federal legislative regulation
of the slave trade until 1808.259 Thus the Constitution's resolution is twofold:
There is one Constitution for the moment, where political debate is constrained
and a federal solution imposed. The provisional language of the document,
however, leaves open the possibility of another prospective resolution. 260
When it came to perhaps the most politically contentious issue, the
Constitution offered only an interim guiding principle. A transitional
perspective also illuminates the distinctive understanding of constitutional
justice. The Constitution's protections of freedom and its related conception of
tyranny are better understood in the context of colonial rule. 261 The primary
such constitutional response, often considered the Constitution's crowning
achievement, is the reconstruction of state power. 262 The Constitution's
1981) (expressing skepticism over desirability of frequent constitutional upheaval and revision), with Leiter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 415, 417
(Merrill D. Petersen ed., 1975) (arguing that "a little rebellion now and then is a good thing").
257. See U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem ii
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments ...."). On the amendment
process, see RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
258. Much contemporary constitutional theory has focused on the question of how to reconcile the
contemporary idealized foundationalist view of the enduring Constitution with constitutional change,
whether predicated on the Article V amendment process, or through principles of constitutional
interpretation departing from the original understanding, or by other means. See Akhil Recd Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988)
(evaluating whether Article V ought to be regarded as sole source of constitutional change).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight ...."). The Constitution also provides for the capture and extradition
of fugitive slaves. See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
260. This reading seems to be supported by the express limitation in Article V on such amendments
until 1808. See id. art. V.
261. See GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969)
(discussing impact of years of colonial rule in shaping Union).
262. The Federalist defense of the new scheme of state power is orchestrated in terms of an argument
from history, based on the experience of tyranny characterized by British Parliamentary sovereignty. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (''The accumulation of all
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critical response to monarchic rule is its definition of executive power; 263 an
even more pronounced response to strong executive power is evident in the
interim constitutional measures adopted after the revolution.™ The same was
largely true of the state constitutions, where the governors' terms were limited
and their powers few. 265 Justifications for the structure of executive power
relied on the historical experience of prior monarchic rule. 266
The Constitution's provisions concerning republican rule also suggest a
transformative function. First, reconstitution of the political order occurs
through redefinition of political participation, membership, and leadership. 267
The allocation of military and civilian power responds to abuses of military
rule. 268 A transitional perspective illuminates the contemporary understanding
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many. and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronouncro the very definition of tyranny.").
263. Note that the United States is vinually unique in turrung 10 a pres1dcnual system. Most former
monarchies move from strong executive systems to parliamentary systems. Su Karl Loewenstein, The
Presidency Outside the United Stales: A Study in Comparam·e Polincal lnsnnmons, 11 J POL 447, 462
(1949). The American anomaly is best explained wnhm a transiuonal analys1S.
264. At the time of the Articles of Confederauon. d1suus1 of ccntrahzcd power was so powaful that
the Continental Congress was impotent lo tax and regulate commerce. Amclc Vlll pro\•1ded that
[E]xpenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by
the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury. which
shall be supplied by the several States, in proportion to the value of all land \\1tlun each
state.... The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authomy and
direction of the Legislatures of the several States ...
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1781, art. Vill. Article IX, in tum. provided.
The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive nghl and power
of ... entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made
whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from
prolubmng
the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodiues whatsoever
Id. art. IX.
For an argument suggesting a reading of the American Consutuuon m hght of 11S hlStoncal legacy
in the Articles of Confederation, though one not explicitly characterized as transitional, sec Aklul Reed
Amar, 17ie Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131. 1150-51 (1991)
265. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF Tl{E AMERICAN COSSTTTUTION
80-81 (1990).
266. The reasoning in the Federalist arguments for the proposed cxccuuve power worlr.:s backward from
the institution of the King. Whereas the King's rule was unbounded, the four-year limned pn:s1dcnual tenn
prevents abuse of power. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 415-16 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). Other features of the proposed presidenual powers have analogous JUSUficat1ons. Bet.'1USC the
King's veto power was plenary, it followed that the qualified pres1denual veto l5 limned and appropnate
See id. at 416-17. The extent of historical monarchic powers IS used to JUsufy the proposed qualified
presidential treaty power, as well as the President's constrained war power Su 1d. at 417-20
267. Anti-aristocratic features appear in a number of consmuuonal pro\'1S1ons. most prominently m
the express prohibition of nobility. Su U.S. CONST. an 1, § 9, cl 8 ("No Title of Nobthty shall be granted
by the United States: And no Person holding any Office or Profit or Trust under them. shall. wuhout the
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument. Office, or Title, of any kmd whatever, from
grant any Title of
any King, Prince, or foreign State."); id. an. 1, § 10, cl. 1 ("'No State shall
Nobility."); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, al 511-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed .• 1961)
Qualifications and terms for political participation and representauon indicate a cnucal response to the pnor
§ I; SU also THE FEDERALIST Nos 52. 53.
order. See U.S. CONST. an. I, § 2; id. an. II, § 1; id. an.
at 327-30, 330-32 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed .. 1961)
268. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, els. 11-16 (granting Congress significant m1htary powers). 1d. amend.
II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secumy of a free State. the nght of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."); id. amend. Ill ("'No Soldier shall. m tunes of peace be quancred
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in tune of war. but m a manner to be prcscnbcd by
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of rights provisions such as the Second Amendment. 269
A vivid illustration of transitional constitutionalism is Reconstruction, a
time of profound struggle over how to transform the Union. The
Reconstruction Amendments appear highly backward-looking, as they
normatively structure the constitutional status of the confederate secession. 270
The Amendments respond to the evil of slavery by imposing new obligations
on the Southern States; only by affinning the principle of equality under law,
could states reenter the Union and be equally represented in Congress. 271
Conditions for public office in the Fourteenth Amendment disqualified
Confederate supporters.272 Reconstruction's political disabilities would
ultimately be short-lived. 273 Nevertheless, they remain forever in the text of
the American Constitution as an enduring expression of extraconstitutional
politics. Understanding the transitional relationship between post-Civil War
constitutional law and politics has profound implications for contemporary
debates concerning the interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments. 274
A transitional perspective evaluates the Reconstruction jurisprudence within its
context of political transformation, with implications for contemporary
controversies.
This Section has suggested ways in which the American Constitution can
be better understood from a transitional perspective. By offering a more
nuanced view of the nature and role of constitutionalism, the above discussion
complements the prevailing model. Transitional constitutionalism also has
implications for constitutional interpretation. A transitional perspective
contributes a unique view to debates over the ongoing relevance of "original
Jaw.").
269. See id. amend. II; Sanford Levinson, Comment: The Embarrassing Second Amendmellt, 99 YALB
L.J. 637, 648 (1989) (noting that one foundation of Second Amendment was "well-justified concern about

political corruption and consequent government tyranny").
270. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 ("But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States ... but all
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.").
271. See id. amend. XIV, §§ 1-2.
272. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice
President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote
of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Id. amend. XIV, § 3. This Section took effect in July 1868.
273. As provided for in the Amendment itself, most of the disqualifications were removed by Congress
by 1872. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 193 (1970).
274. Compare RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 157-245, 167 (1977) (arguing that
"framers meant to outlaw discrimination only with respect to enumerated privileges" and that Framers did
not intend "to open goals beyond those specified in the Civil Rights Act and constitutionalizcd in the
Amendment"), witlz Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in tlze Era of tlze Civil War
and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 881-903, 910-35 (1986) (explaining amendments in context
of republican theory of federal citizenship and generic nature of fundamental rights).
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intent" to the contemporary significance of relevant constitutional
provisions. 275 The transitional perspective shares with the "fidelity" school
of interpretation276 the understanding that constitutions are best examined in
light of historical and political contexts, but it adds to the understanding of
constitutions as codifying purposes that are transformative and dynamic. The
relevant interpretive inquiry might be to what extent the relevant constitutional
provision is considered transitional and whether transformative in purpose.
With the passage of time, transitional constitutional features will operate in a
dynamic fashion, either withering away or expanding in their transformative
purposes. This mix of possible original purposes advises a more nuanced
approach to the relevance of original intent. Thus the transitional perspective
offers a distinctive principle of constitutional interpretation with a number of
interpretive consequences.
C. Transitional Constitutionalism: Some Co11clusio11s
Prevailing constitutional theorizing does not fully account for the
constitutional phenomena associated with substantial political change. This is
particularly true of the late twentieth century. The central ideas of modem
constitutionalism are its eighteenth-century response to premodem rule and its
restraint on political arrangements. Constitutionalism in its third century,
however, is both normative and transformative in its response to the
preexisting political order. Such constitutionalism displays a dialectical quality
of varying modalities: critical, residual, and restorative.m As such, this
paradigm helps account for the threshold dilemma created by
constitutionmaking in revolutionary times. Transitional constitutionalism
bridges radical political change by reconciling dichotomous understandings of
law and politics. Moreover, transitions demonstrate how constitutionalism

275. See BERGER, supra note 274 (defending originahsm); ROBERT H. BORK. THE Ta!Pro:O OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF TIIE LAW (1990) (same); Roben H Bork. 77ie Cons111u11on.
Original Inrenr, and Economic Rig/us, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823 (1986) (same); see alw Paul Bn:st. Tiu
Misconceived Quesrfor the Original U11dersr011di11g. 60 B.U. L. REV 204 (1980) (cnucwng onginahsm).
Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Co11sriturion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv 353. 37.t-87 (1981) (mucwng Brest.
supra); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalisrs, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (offcnng 1-l pnnc1plcs for
originalist interprelalion); Mark V. Tushnet, Followmg the Rules Laid Do1rn: A Cnr1que of /nterpretmsm
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781. 786-804 (1983) (denying poss1b1hty o! onginahsm w11hout
communitarian underpinnings).
For a thoughtful perspective on originalism that argues !or us relevance as a lloor. sec gcru:rally Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Consrirurio11 as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ 1119 (1995). which incorporates onginahsm
into "commitmentarian" interpretive model.
276. On "fidelity" to the Constitution, see genernlly Lawrence Lessig, F1Jdir) 111 Translmwn, 11 TEX
L. REV. 1165 (1993). The central idea of this interprcll\'C lheory 1s !he prcscn·auon o! mcarung across nmc
and context. But see Lawrence Lessig, \\'liar Dri1·es Demabtlm·· Responses 10 Rrspo11d111g to Jmpafectwn.
74 TEX. L REV. 839 (1996). From a 1rans1uonal perspecuvc. howc\·cr, the problem in this .ipproach is !hat
it generally assumes a unitary, constitutional purpose over umc. m1SSmg other more transformatwc purposes
of a dynamic nature.
277. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text
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reinforces democracy. In ordinary times, constitutionalism appears in conflict
with democracy, but during times of transition, constitutionalism plays a
unique role in facilitating the move to a more liberal regime.
Transitional constitutionalism provides an alternative paradigm. The
paradigm's distinctive paradox is that, as in the premodern conception,
constitutionalism does not stand independently from the political order but is
inextricably enmeshed in transformative politics. Nevertheless, as in the
modern conception, transitional constitutions also transcend transitory political
arrangements. The transitional paradigm elaborates a more nuanced relationship
between constitutional and ordinary politics: Transitional constitutions not only
operate as codifications of prevailing consensus but also transform that
consensus. Moreover, these two concepts of constitutional purpose are not
mutually exclusive; indeed, they may well coexist within a single
instrument. 278 Thus the view proposed here complements prevailing
constitutional theory. What distinguishes the transitional constitutional
paradigm is its constructive relation to a political order in flux. Transitional
constitutionalism comprehends different phases; ranging from provisional
measures intended to shape the transient political order for a limited time to
those entrenched and even superentrenched laws that guide a state's core
political identity. In its disentrenching role, the transitional constitution ratifies
new political arrangements to liberalize political space, enabling a more liberal
order. Transitional constitutionalism varies from provisional to ultraentrenched, as guardian of the future constitutional order.
The paradigm of transitional constitutionalism illuminates the special
contribution of constitutionmaking in periods of political change. In eschewing
the prevailing tendency to collapse constitutionalism with revolutionary
political change, the proposed paradigm has the virtue of creating a space for
the critique of the nature and role of constitutionalism in periods of
transformation. The paradigm of transitional constitutionalism also has
implications for our understanding of constitutionalism's normative force and
its relation to other uses of the law. Critical constitutionalism implies an
explicitly transformative response to prior repressive rule. To the extent that
the constitutions discussed above reflect a critical response to the legacy of the
ancien regime, transitional constitutionalism enables a sense of justice. Critical
constitutional responses to the predecessor political regime also play a
justificatory role for· the transition by delegitimating aspects of the ancien
regime and legitimating its successor. To the extent that these structural
principles enable normative expressions of accountability, they overlap with
other normative uses of the law, such as criminal law, in these extraordinary

278. They often do. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text (regarding American
Constitution).
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periods.279 Contemporary postmodern constitutional norms delimit and
transcend the structuring of state power to guide broader normative
understandings of the social order. Finally, a transitional constitutional
perspective offers a glimpse of constitutional progress. This vision of progress
is not essential or universal but limited and contingent. Understandings of
distinctive national legacies of injustice enable construction of constitutional
constraints truly responsive to a state's political, historical, and constitutional
legacies.

IV.

A TRANSITIONAL

JURISPRUDENCE

Let us return to the questions posed at the outset: What is the relationship
between legal responses to past repression and a state's prospects for
meaningful liberalizing political change? How do societies make the transition
from illiberal regimes? What are the nature and role of law in this
transformation? The legal responses analyzed here occur within a bounded
period following the change in regime, heralding a shift to a more liberal
regime. Such periods are not easily captured within prevailing theorizing about
the rule of law in a liberal state. Transitional jurisprudence examines the way
law mediates such periods and constructs the transition, thereby describing this
bounded domain. Affinities in the forms of responsive law-adjudicatory,
punitive, and constitutional-point to a paradigm of transformative law. Legal
practices in such periods reveal a struggle between two points, between settled
and revolutionary times, as well as a dialectically induced third position.
Persistent dichotomous choices arise as to law's role in periods of political
change: backward versus forward, retroactive versus prospective, continuity
versus discontinuity, individual versus collective, law versus politics.
Transitional legal mechanisms mediate these antinomies.
In periods of political change, the role of law defies the categories and
guiding principles governing ordinary periods. In ordinary times, law is largely
continuous and prospective. In transitional times, by contrast, law's
directionality is ambivalent; it is simultaneously continuous and discontinuous,
retrospective and prospective. Thus in the "transitional domain," the rule of
law does not follow idealist conceptions: Instead, the rule of law is constructed
in relation to past conceptions of injustice, and an extraordinary form of the
rule of law emerges. 280 The role and function of the transitional criminal law
are similarly distinctive from punishment in ordinary times. In the transitional
criminal sanction, an extraordinary form of limited sanction emerges. Sanctions
ordinarily establish individual responsibility for past wrongdoing, but in
transitional times, the foci are the relations of the past to the present and the
279. See supra text accompanying note 96.
280. See supra Section I.E.
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individual to the collective.281 Transitional constitutional law also truces on
a distinctive form. In ordinary times, constitutionalism is conceived as entirely
forward-looking in nature, designed to endure for generations.
Constitutionalism in transitional times is particularly retrospective in nature,
justificatory and constructive of the political transformation. 282
Transitional law is fluid in form. This fluidity bears on the central
normative question in this area of study: Which ideal legal response is most
likely to usher in a lasting democratic system?283 Yet with the breaJcdown in
categorical uses of the law, the question becomes irrelevant, a remnant of
ordinary times. Transitional constitutions serve apparently ordinary, regulative
purposes. Criminal and civil sanctions are used interchangeably to generate
rights and duties. Transitional adjudication seems unfair, trials lack
punishment, and constitutions do not last. Affinities in the various forms of
transitional law-procedural, penal, constitutional-underscore law's ultimate
transformative role in the construction of transition. The law expresses new
norms and does the work of reconstruction.
What is the role of law in periods of transformation? For some time,
critical theorists have been engaged in comparative work regarding transitions,
yet the object of inquiry has generally been the transmittal of societal norms
or societal reproduction across generations and over time. 284 But the ordinary
social construction and legitimation problems are inapposite in extraordinary
periods of political upheaval. The question of social transformation replaces the
question of social reproduction. Although such periods are commonly
envisioned as moments of rupture, I suggest that there is rarely such total
discontinuity but instead various processes and mechanisms that enable
mediation of the past towards transformation. It is through familiar forms that
societies comprehend liberalizing change. The question then becomes how to
synthesize transformation within the law.
How do legal responses help to enable the transition? In the transitional
model, transformation occurs through the use of law to clarify and sanction
past wrongs. Through investigatory and condemnatory processes, the law
exposes and delegitimates the value system associated with past rule, clearing
the way for transformative norm change. Legal measures promote creation of
public knowledge about past wrongdoing, and judicial opinions, trials, and
constitutions provide formal, public justifications. The law, therefore,
contributes to the epistemological and interpretive changes necessary to
comprehend transition; through public justification legal forms reconstitute

281. See supra Section II.D.
282. See supra Section 111.C.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
284. For example, Berger and Luckmann describe the ordinary legitimation problem as arising in the
institutional reproduction between generations. See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 17, at 86; see also
CONNERTON, supra note 171.
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state and societal interests, thereby instantiating transition. The uses of the law
here are particularly well-suited to the legitimation problems inherent in
periods of massive political change. All of these practices, in one fashion or
another, are attempts to delimit and pass judgment upon past abuses of state
power. Affinities in these responses suggest that these practices do not
arbitrarily depart from the rule of law but recognize past abuses of power by
the state. The legal responses to systematic persecution attempt to supervene
and transcend prevailing politics.
The analysis of transitional jurisprudence offers some sense of how
societies work through repressive periods to periods of greater liberality.
Indeed, we might conceive of the transitional legal mechanisms as mediating
between repressive and liberal regimes. Ultimately it is in part through these
legal phenomena that we grasp whether a transition has occurred. These legal
responses help to construct the transition. These mediating mechanisms and
structures publicly elucidate and justify the normative changes associated with
political transformation. These mechanisms, whether adjudicatory procedures.
trials, or constitutionmaking, are ultimately the symbols of working liberal
regimes; thus, as the transitional justice problem is resolved, the society has
already begun to operate as a more liberal order. Although transitional
jurisprudence comprehends justice claims associated with liberalizing change,
these claims are not equivalent to those of a fully established democracy.
Accordingly, recognition of a transitional jurisprudence provides a vocabulary
for critical appraisal of legal developments in the context of liberalizing
political change.
Further, the field of transitional jurisprudence has implications for better
understanding of law's role in social change. The operation of the law in these
periods follows neither the traditional liberal view of law as largely
autonomous from politics, nor the critical view of law as epiphenomena!.
Recognition of this domain raises a challenge to critical legal theorizing. As
distinguishable from the role of law in ordinary times, the uses of the law
discussed above construct the very understandings of radical political change.
Recognition of this hyperpoliticized transformative domain is inconvenient for
liberal theories of law as well as for political theorizing that attempts to make
normative forecasts about law's bearing upon societal prospects for liberal
consolidation.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article gives an account of the nature and role of law in periods of
political transformation. It suggests that legal forms during such periods point
to a transitional jurisprudence constituted by and constitutive of the transition.
The transitional jurisprudence associated with periods of political upheaval
ultimately also plays a role in shaping the sense of liberalizing change.
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Recognizing a distinct domain of transitional jurisprudence should have
profound consequences for prevailing legal theorizing, and, in particular, for
our normative understanding of law's relation to politics. Beyond its
contribution to understanding law's role in periods of political change,
transitional jurisprudence advances the critique of prevailing theories of justice.
An understanding of the conception of law proposed here can help mediate the
liberal~critical debate over theories of law. The liberal idealization views law
as independent from culture and politics, and conceptualizes justice from an
idealist "original" position. 285 The view of justice offered here, by contrast,
is concededly from a transitional position. 286 The legal practices discussed
above suggest that the content of justice and rights are understandings
determined not in the abstract, but rather in response and in relation to legacies
of injustice within a distinctive transitional context. 287

285. See generally RAWLS, supra note 6, at 22-28.
286. I only offer this point here, leaving for my forthcoming book broader treatment of this question.
See TEITEL, supra note t.
287. The conception of justice put forward here shares affinities with certain political theorizing. See
EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE Of INJUSTICE: AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW Of LAW (1949) (arguing for
situated rather than abstract legal philosophy); Judith Shklar, Tiie Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND
THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (discussing relationship between concrete political
crisis and theories of justice).

